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PLAYING WITH FIRE: THE SCIENCE OF CONFRONTING
ADVERSE MATERIAL IN LEGAL ADVOCACY

Kathryn M. Stanchi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although much of the attention on persuasion in law has focused
on how to frame supporting arguments, persuasion is not only about
how to present favorable information. Confronting and defusing
negative information is a critical aspect of the art of persuasion. But
disclosure of negative information raises substantial and thorny
questions about advocacy and persuasion because it is, by definition,
not helpful to the client's position. Lawyers have depicted the
dilemma of what to do with negative information in vividly
unpleasant terms, likening disclosure to a "self-inflicted wound" and
describing the decision to disclose as "agonizing" and "painful."1
Given these descriptions, it is not surprising that there is
considerable controversy among both appellate practitioners and
trial lawyers regarding when and how to address information that
potentially undermines the position they are advocating.2 Although
the rules of professional responsibility require some disclosure of
negative information, the rules leave much discretion to lawyers, and

* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. The
author thanks Sarah Ricks and Kristin Gerdy for their excellent comments on prior
drafts of this piece. Many thanks also to Joellen Meckley for her superb research
assistance and general editorial help. This paper was supported by grants from
Temple Law School.
1. Angela Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to Disclose Damaging Legal
Authority, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 303 (1995); Kay Nord Hunt & Eric J. Magnuson,
Ethical Issues on Appeal, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 659, 672 (1993); Risa B. Lischkoff,
Recent Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 315, 315 (1995).
2. See James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse
in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs, 17
DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 7-13 (1994). Compare C. Geoffrey Hazard Jr., Arguing the
Law: The Advocate's Duty' and Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821 (1982), with Richard
Silverman, Is New Jersey's Heightened Duty of Candor Too Much of a Good Thing?, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 951 (2006).
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so the decision is, in most instances, a strategic one. 3 The vehemence
of the disagreement among lawyers about the appropriate strategy,
as well as the pain of the dilemma, is a testament to the high stakes
of the question. If the advocate makes a strategic decision to disclose
negative information and that decision turns out to be a mistake, the
advocate has not only weakened her own case, but has taken
affirmative steps that will strengthen the other side's case.
The disagreement about when to confront negative information
goes to the heart of what it means to be an advocate in the
adversarial system and reveals a fundamental disagreement among
lawyers about persuasive strategy and zealous advocacy. Those who
resist disclosing negative information start from the premise that
such disclosure in a persuasive context is inconsistent with the duty
of zealous advocacy.4 Advocates in this camp feel that preemptive
disclosure of negative information is rarely strategically advisable.5
Beyond those situations where it is ethically mandated, the decision
to disclose should be approached with great caution. Advocates on
the other side argue that disclosure of negative information is in the
client's interests and therefore entirely consistent with zealous
advocacy, both because confrontation of negative information makes
the positive arguments deeper and stronger and because candid
confrontation enhances the advocate's credibility.6
This Article seeks to shed light on this controversy by looking
carefully at the social science research on persuasion, particularly
the social science that addresses the handling of negative
information in persuasive messages. The Article does not take sides
in the ethical debate over whether a lawyer's duty of candor should
trump the duty of zealous advocacy or vice versa, a question that has
sometimes characterized the debate on this issue.7 Rather, the focus

3.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007). The rules require disclosure

of negative authority and negative facts under certain circumstances; see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).

4. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16
GA. L. REV. 833, 837-38 (1982); Silverman, supra note 2, at 951, 959; see also ROBERT
H.

KLONOFF

&

PAUL

L.

COLBY, WINNING

JURY

TRIALS:

TRIAL

TACTICS

AND

SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY (2d ed. 2002).
5. See Freedman, supra note 4, at 838.
6. See generally Quentin Brogdon, Inoculating Against Bad Facts: Brilliant Trial
Strategy or Misguided Dogma?, 63 TEX. B.J. 443, 447 (2000); Hazard, supra note 2, at
831-32; L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a
Dilemma After Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 615, 616-17 (2001);
Kathryn A. Sampson, Disclosing and Confronting Adverse Authority, http://comp
.uark.edul-ksampsoradverse authority.htm.
7. See, e.g., Christopher W. Deering, Candor Toward the Tribunal: Should an
Attorney Sacrifice Truth and Integrity for the Sake of the Client?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 59, 63-64 (1997).
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of this Article is on persuasion. Thus, the Article seeks to use the
science to determine what treatment of adverse information is most
beneficial to the client's position. A careful study of the science
reveals that, overall, it is advantageous for the advocate to volunteer
negative information and rebut it early, and that a direct and indepth confrontation of negative information is generally more
effective than an indirect and cursory treatment.
A close look at the finer points of the data, however, reveals that
the question of disclosure is a complicated one. Therefore, legal
advocates should learn about the research findings and the theories
underlying the research in making the decision about whether to
volunteer adverse information. For example, the general rule
favoring disclosure applies where the advocate has a competent and
effective refutation for the information; when such a refutation is not
available or is weak, the advocate may be better off not disclosing.
Moreover, the data also reveal that there are somewhat surprising
reasons for the persuasive advantage of preemptive disclosure that
go beyond the conventional wisdom of boosting credibility. Advocates
who fully understand the reasons underlying the persuasive value of
disclosure will be better guided in their decision making about when
to disclose. Moreover, teachers of advocacy will be better able to
guide their students. Advocates who arm themselves with deeper
knowledge of how people react to the disclosure of negative
information will be in a better position to make decisions for their
clients, and will have a better feel for the winning strategy.
II.

THE CONTROVERSIES OVER DISCLOSURE OF NEGATIVE
INFORMATION

The threshold question in advocacy regarding the treatment of
negative information is whether to disclose at all. That question can
be difficult, particularly when opposing counsel has not raised or
cited the information.s Embedded in this threshold question are the
related, and perhaps more practical, questions of when and how to
disclose adverse information. For example, should an advocate wait
for opposing counsel to raise it, or raise it preemptively (which of
course risks raising information that might never have seen the light
of day)? Having decided to disclose, should an advocate directly
confront it or allude to it in a more indirect or oblique fashion?

8. Practically speaking, this question is relatively narrow. Most lawyers will not
raise adverse information that they are not ethically required to disclose when
opposing counsel either has not, or is not likely to, cite or disclose the information.
Similarly, it is rare that lawyers would make the strategic decision to ignore adverse
information raised by the other side.
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This part of the Article explores the vigorous debate among
lawyers over the disclosure of negative information, in particular to
uncover the divergent philosophies that lawyers have about the most
persuasive approach toward negative information. The Article traces
this debate from the various controversies over the ethical duty to
disclose adverse authority in the context of appellate practice to the
controversy over preemptive disclosure of negative facts in the trial
context. In both the appellate and trial contexts, the same rationales
appear repeatedly as justifications for disclosing-or notunfavorable information. It is the validity of these rationales that the
social science research can shed light on.
A.

RationalesAgainst Disclosure

Lawyers who advocate disclosing adverse information only in
very narrow circumstances support their position by pointing to the
duty of zealous advocacy.9 In the view of these lawyers, disclosure of
negative information is harmful to the client's position and should
generally be avoided. For these lawyers, the adversary system and
the lawyer-client relationship depend on the lawyer's role as
champion for the client, not as a research assistant for the judge or,
even worse, for opponents.1o Because the adversary system depends
on the two sides presenting their positions as strongly as possible,
the system is best served by making the most positive argument
possible and raising negative information only in narrow
circumstances.
The clash over disclosure is illustrated by the various
impassioned debates over the duty of candor. For example, advocates
espousing this rationale raised a storm of opposition in response to
the Kutak Commission's proposed revisions of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in the late 1970s.11 Among other things,
the Kutak Commission had recommended substantially broadening

9. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 2, at 827; Theodore I. Koskoff, ProposedNew Code
of ProfessionalResponsibility: 1984 is Now!, 54 CONN. B.J. 260, 262 (1980) (describing
as totalitarian the requirement that advocates reveal detrimental information to the
court and opposing counsel); Silverman, supra note 2, at 952.
10. Ralph Gregory Elliot, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Invention Not Mothered by Necessity?, 54 CONN. B.J. 265, 280 (1980); Koskoff, supra
note 9, at 261-62. See generally Freedman, supra note 4, at 838 (arguing that writing a
brief harmful to the client is inconsistent with the fidelity and zealousness that a
lawyer owes a client); Joanne Pitulla, Playing Ostrich: Courts are Getting Tough with
Lawyers who Forget to Cite Adverse Authority, 79 A.B.A. J. 97, 97 (1993) (noting that
many attorneys argue against having to do research and supply arguments for the
other side); Robert B. Tunstall, A Plea for Re-Interpretationof a Canon, 35 A.B.A. J. 5,
6 (1949) (stating that a lawyer "is an advocate, not an umpire").
11. Forward:Symposium on ProposedNew A.B.A. Code, 54 CONN. B.J. 259 (1980).
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the duty of candor to require advocates to disclose to the tribunal a
wider array of negative information.12
For example, one Kutak Commission recommendation would
have expanded the requirements for disclosure of adverse authority
in a brief.13 At the time, the rule regarding adverse authority was the
same as it is now: a lawyer is prohibited from knowingly failing "to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel," a rule that leaves
unregulated a vast amount of potentially adverse authority and gives
advocates substantial leeway for strategic decisions about negative
information.14 The Kutak Commission recommendation required
disclosure of any authority that would "probably have a substantial
effect on the determination of a material issue."15 This rule would
have worked a substantial change in the disclosure requirements.16
Lawyers who opposed this change argued that the broadening of
the duty of candor inappropriately changed the lawyer's role from
"champion and agent of the client" to "disinterested servant" of the
public.17 They argued that broadening the disclosure rules was
inconsistent with the role of the lawyer in the American adversary

12. Deering, supra note 7, at 83. In this regard, the Kutak Commission controversy
itself was, in some respects, history repeating itself. In the 1930s, the American Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances had also attempted to
impose upon the bar a broad duty to disclose adverse law, an imposition that
engendered similar controversy. Id. (citing Freeman, supra note 4).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft 1980).
14.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007); see also MODEL CODE OF

PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1980); Freedman, supra note 4, at 835-36. For
example, among other things the rule requires disclosure of authority only if it is from
the "controlling" jurisdiction, which arguably leaves out authority from anywhere
outside the jurisdiction. Moreover, the rule only requires disclosure of "directly
adverse" authority and leaves to the lawyer's judgment what authority should be
considered "directly adverse." Id.
15. Hazard, supra note 2, at 826 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.1(c) (Discussion Draft 1980)).
16. Id. at 826-27 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c) (Discussion
Draft 1980)). For example, it would have changed the leeway that lawyers had for
failing to disclose authority that could be very persuasive but falls outside the
"controlling jurisdiction." Id. at 829 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c)
(Discussion Draft 1980)). It would also have broadened the authority required to be
disclosed from "directly adverse" to authority with a probable "substantial effect" on
the issues. Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft
1980)). Moreover, while the current rule arguably did not cover a case that could be
distinguished or otherwise rebutted, the proposed rule would have required disclosure
of such cases. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft 1980);

Freedman, supra note 4, at 835-36.
17. Elliot, supra note 10, at 267.
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system and the notion of zealous advocacy.18 They characterized the
broadening of the disclosure rules as "destructive to the adversary
system and the lawyer-client relationship ... regressive, and
dangerous."19 Noting that the rule would be contrary to the
prevailing wisdom among most litigators, these lawyers also argued
that the rule would be routinely defied.20 At the core of the debate
was the belief that disclosure of negative information harms the
client and is therefore at odds with the duty of zealous advocacy.
Another example of this view of advocacy is the sponsorship
theory of jury trials.21 Proponents of sponsorship theory argue that a
client is irreparably harmed when his lawyer, as opposed to the
opponent, introduces a bad fact.22 The theory is that jurors will
punish a lawyer who discloses-or sponsors-information that harms
his position because people assume that lawyers are putting forth the
best case possible.23 For this reason, a lawyer should almost never
preemptively disclose negative information.24 This theory presumes
that people view advocates as fundamentally biased, like "hired
gun[s]."25 Therefore, any negative information offered by the side it
hurts will carry a heavy presumption of relevance and materiality.26
In other words, if an advocate discloses negative information, people
will assume that it is important to her side. Moreover, advocates
presumably will present the best case possible; so if an advocate
introduces negative evidence, it will be assumed that his absolute
best case included this negative information and that it presents the
evidence in the best possible light.27

18. See Koskoff, supra note 9, at 261; see also Silverman, supra note 2, at 951. See
generally Deering, supra note 7, at 69.
19. Koskoff, supra note 9, at 260 (critiquing Kutak Commission); see also Deering,
supra note 7, at 69 n.65 (citing Tunstall, supra note 10, at 6).
20. See Elliot, supra note 10, at 280-81; see also Freedman, supra note 4, at 837
(noting that a survey of the District of Columbia Bar in 1972 revealed that ninetythree percent of lawyers "would not disclose adverse authority that was not cited by
opposing counsel") (emphasis added); Tunstall, supra note 10, at 5 (arguing that the
1935 ABA ruling was undoubtedly "habitually violated").
21. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 4, § 1.02.
22. See id. § 2.02(1). Sponsorship theory advises attorneys against a default
position of disclosure of bad facts. See id. Although Klonoff and Colby limit their
theory to jury trials, the rationales they offer mirror those used by appellate lawyers to
argue against disclosure of adverse authority.
23. See id.
24. See id. § 1.02.
25. See id. § 2.02(1).
26. See id. § 2.02(1). Proponents of sponsorship theory also note that the same
psychology leads people to devalue as "self-serving" any good information disclosed by
the side it helps. See id. § 2.03(1).
27. Id. § 2.02(2)(a)-(f).
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For example, a plaintiffs lawyer following sponsorship theory
may not elicit the fact that a plaintiff claiming employment
discrimination was fired from her prior job, even if he has reason to
believe that the other side will use that information on crossexamination.28 Raising the information will imbue it with special
relevance, and the jury is likely to disregard the plaintiffs
explanation for the termination as self-serving.29 Instead, foregoing
any mention of the prior termination on direct allows the advocate to
argue credibly in summation that the termination is irrelevant to the

case and the jury should ignore

it.30

In sum, lawyers who are against a default position of
volunteering negative information argue that it will harm the client's
case and is therefore inconsistent with zealous advocacy. Because of
the lawyer's role as advocate, disclosure of negative information will
imbue that information with special weight and relevance. Therefore,
the lawyer should not disclose negative information unless the
lawyer is ethically required to or it is otherwise unavoidable.
B. Rationalesfor Disclosure
The advocates on the other side have a diametrically opposite
view of zealous advocacy. In their view, acknowledgment and
rebuttal of adverse information is a critical component of persuasion
and the best method of advocacy for the client.31 Disclosure of
adverse information helps advance the client's cause not only by
strengthening the substance of the case, but also by enhancing the
credibility of the lawyer.32
28.

See id.

29. See id. § 4.04(2).
30. See id.
31. See MARGARET Z.

JOHNS, PROFESSIONAL WRITING FOR LAWYERS 209 (1998);
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 334 (5th ed. 2005);

MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 152 (2002); Brogdon, supra note 6, at
444 (citing various commentators who advise preemptive disclosure as a way to
persuade the jury to accept the advocate's position); Hazard, supra note 2, at 830-31;
see also Perrin, supra note 6, at 622 (noting that many of the metaphors for negative
disclosure, such as "drawing the sting" or "pricking the boil," liken the disclosure to a
surgical procedure that is painful but essential for "long term health"). Some
commentators do mention the integrity of the trial process and its credibility as
reasons to disclose all relevant facts, but this is often a secondary consideration. See
Floyd Abrams, Trial Tactics, 101 YALE L.J. 1159, 1175-76 (1992) (book review).
32. It should be noted here that most judges encourage lawyers to preemptively
and openly disclose weaknesses. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL:
BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT § 13.5 (Rev. 1st ed. 1996) ("An appellant should

never deliberately save for the reply its response to an argument."); MARY BETH
BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 78 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting

Judge Fred I. Parker); NEUMANN, supra note 31, at 331 (quoting Judges Roger Miner
and Clyde H. Hamilton). While judges are certainly a good source of what is
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In the appellate realm, advocates espousing this view maintain
that the strongest arguments are those that offer both positive
supporting points and refutation of opposing views.33 Confrontation
of adverse authority makes a brief stronger, even if that authority is
unknown to the court or opposing counsel, because "[tihe weight of
an argumentative position can be properly gauged only by reference
to what can be set against it."34 Moreover, confronting adverse
authority gives the advocate the opportunity to present the authority
in the most favorable light or otherwise refute it.35 A similar
rationale supports disclosure of negative facts in the trial context: by
volunteering a bad fact early in trial, the advocate has the
opportunity to frame or shape the fact and present it in the best
possible light, whereas nondisclosure defers to opposing counsel the
opportunity to characterize the fact.36
In this way, disclosure of negative information removes the sting
of negativity and divests opposing counsel of the opportunity to
expose and capitalize on it.37 Trial lawyers in particular rely for
support on the communications theory of inoculation to argue that
preemptive disclosure is scientifically proven to be a better
persuasive strategy. 38 The theory of inoculation posits that advocates
can make the recipient of a persuasive message resistant to opposing
arguments, much like a vaccination makes a patient resistant to
disease.39

persuasive in legal writing, they are not the definitive source. Judges may have other
reasons, beyond persuasion and good advocacy, why they want all the arguments and
authorities to be made in the most comprehensive way possible in the opening brief.
Judge Aldisert alludes to this when he says, "Reply briefs are not the favorite children
of appellate judges." ALDISERT, supra, § 13.5.
33. See BEAZLEY, supra note 32, at 78-80; NEUMANN, supra note 31, at 334-35;
Deering, supra note 7, at 87 & n.182 (arguing that disclosure allows attorneys to place
favorable spin on adverse authority); Kristen K. Robbins, ParadigmLost: Recapturing
Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 516-22 (2003)
(describing the failure to address opposing arguments as "myopic vision" because it
often results from an advocate's failure to see the weaknesses of her own arguments).
34. Hazard, supra note 2, at 828.
35. NEUMANN, supra note 31, at 334-35; HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 431 (Rev. 4th ed. 2003); Hunt & Magnuson, supra note 1, at 673;
Douglas R. Richmond, Appellate Ethics: Truth, Criticism and Consequences, 23 REV.
LITIG. 301, 324-25 (2004).
36. Brogdon, supra note 6, at 444; Perrin, supra note 6, at 616-17.
37. See, e.g., THOMAS MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 70-71 (7th ed. 2007); Abrams,
supra note 31, at 1164-65; Brogdon, supra note 6, at 444-45; Perrin, supra note 6, at
616-17.
38. See, e.g., Brogdon, supra note 6, at 444.
39.

RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND

ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 125 (2d ed. 2003); see also supra Part III.B.
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Advocates who favor this approach label a strategy of presenting
only positive arguments as superficial, myopic, and, ultimately,
unconvincing.40 They also argue that the best strategy is to take the
least controversial path to victory, the "middle ground"-meaning the
path that best reconciles supporting and opposing information.41 This
strategy seeks to present a brief that essentially writes the opinion
for the judge, who will want a way to deal with opposing information
in the opinion.42 As one commentator noted:
The chance of prevailing is greatest if the decision point
involves the greatest concession with respect to the client's
position that is consistent with victory for the client. That is,
where the question is seriously debatable, the strongest position
for the client is one that borders on concession to the opposing
party. Any more extravagant position on behalf of the client
may seem stronger because it is less equivocal. However, it is
actually weaker because it asks the court to reject the
competing value in greater degree than is minimally necessary
to decide the case in the client's favor.43
Although this commentator was referring to adverse authority in a
persuasive brief, the same rationale supports a trial strategy that
includes and acknowledges negative facts.
Credibility is a major factor in support of broader disclosure of
negative information. Under this rationale, an attorney who has
impressed the court with his trustworthiness and intelligence is more
likely to prevail because he has cultivated the court's respect and
goodwill.44 Preemptive disclosure will enhance the lawyer's
credibility with the trier of fact, and a concession confessed by the
side hurt by it will be forgiven, whereas the trier will not forgive the
lawyer (or his client) if it perceives that the lawyer attempted to
"hide" the bad fact.45 Indeed, failure to disclose negative information
might enhance the importance of the information, because the
audience will assume that a competent lawyer would refute the
information if refutation were possible.46 Similarly, credibility
arguments also encompass lawyer reputation, noting that judges will

40. Robbins, supra note 33, at 516-22; see also Hazard, supra note 2, at 828-32.
Professor Hazard charged that those in the practicing bar who ignore adverse
information do so out of ignorance, fear, laziness, and even cowardice. Id. at 827-29.
41. See Robbins, supra note 33, at 516.
42. See Stratman, supranote 2, at 10.
43. Hazard, supranote 2, at 830-31 (emphasis omitted).
44. NEUMANN, supra note 31, at 334; SMITH, supra note 31, at 152; Deering, supra
note 7, at 87; Hunt & Magnuson, supra note 1, at 673; see also JOHN C. DERNBACH ET
AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 251 (3d ed. 2007).
45. GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 131 (1995).
46. See Richmond, supra note 35, at 324-25.

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

view all the arguments of an attorney who has a reputation for
hiding relevant information with greater skepticism.47
In sum, there is a division among lawyers about the appropriate
treatment of negative information.48 Both sides are adamant that
their approach is the best path toward victory for the client; but the
two sides represent two diametrically opposed ideas about what
treatment of negative information best serves the client.
C. How and When to Disclose Negative Information
Once the decision has been made to disclose the negative
information, the advocate still faces a strategic question regarding
how to disclose the information. In both the appellate and trial
contexts, this question engenders controversy similar to the decision
to disclose at all, and the opposing sides divide along comparable
lines.
Many advocates, even some who support preemptive disclosure,
favor a minimalist approach to negative information. One
commentator refers to this brief-writing approach as "adversarial"
because it embodies the duty of the lawyer as a combatant who
should push the client's position as zealously as possible and concede
nothing.49 Mirroring the concerns of sponsorship theory, these
advocates wish to minimize the "air time" given to the negative
information because of the worry that space devoted to adverse
points will inflate their importance or unduly highlight them.50 In
the appellate context, advocates following this approach are likely to
confront adverse authority indirectly.51 This may be done by allusion,
47. Sampson, supra note 6, at 3 ("[A] judge who has once been burned by dishonest
advocacy will not likely be burned in the future.").
48. While some trial lawyers concede that preemptive disclosure is not always the
best strategy, the prevailing wisdom is that preemptive disclosure should be the
default position. See MAUET, supra note 37, at 71 ("Credibility is best maintained by
always being candid, which includes honestly disclosing weaknesses.... ."); Brogdon,
supra note 6, at 447; Kipling D. Williams et al., The Effects of Stealing Thunder in
Criminal and Civil Trials, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 597 (1993) (noting that,
without exception, lawyers stated that there were no circumstances under which bad
facts should be withheld). Appellate lawyers are more divided, though the practicing
bar-as opposed to scholarly commentators or teachers of persuasion-seems to lean
in favor of nondisclosure. See supra Part II.A.
49. Stratman, supra note 2, at 8-9.
50. Id. at 8-9; MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, MICHAEL VITIELLO & DAVID W. MILLER,
PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 39-40 (2d
ed. 2007); JOHNS, supra note 31, at 209; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 35, at 425.
51. Sampson, supra note 7, at 6; Stratman, supra note 2, at 9-10. See generally
Laura Little, Characterizationand Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996).
Professor Little rejects as largely ineffective the more direct refutational strategy of
"negation" and explores the efficacy of the subtler refutational treatments of
recharacterization. Id.
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such as a quick "but see" citation, or by subtly shifting the frame of
the argument so that the authority or argument appears not to
directly conflict with the advocate's goal.52 Overall, the space devoted
to negative information will be minimal, and the negative
information will structurally appear sandwiched between positive
arguments. 53 Similarly, for negative facts in both the trial and
appellate contexts, advocates following this approach will bury
negative facts in the middle of an otherwise positive narrative,
whether the narrative is the statement of facts or direct
examination.54
In the appellate context, many advocates see direct refutation of
opposing viewpoints as akin to playing on the "home team's turf'per se disadvantageous-so the advocate will seek any avenue to
avoid direct refutation. If he must confront opposing arguments
directly, he will do so wholly and without qualification or concession.
The tone of advocacy is unabashedly polemical; there is no attempt to
present the brief as anything other than a one-sided document
designed to push the client's position.55 Advocates following this
approach will almost never make explicit concessions in the brief,
even if the concession is small and unlikely to affect the outcome, on
the theory that concessions demonstrate to a judge that the advocate
is less than fully committed to the thesis or otherwise in a weak
position.56 Similarly, negative information will never be raised
neutrally, without refutation, based on the theory that the advocate
does not want to make an opponent's arguments for her.57
On the other side are advocates who favor disclosure of negative
information specifically because it presents a more balanced picture
of the case. This approach is marked by arguments that do not shy
away from concession and confront adverse information openly.58 In
the brief-writing context, one commentator refers to this as the
"scholarly" style because it tends to be more educational than
combative.59 A brief written in this style is more likely to confront
and explain adverse authority and arguments directly and in-depth,

52.
53.

See Little, supra note 51, at 372-74; Sampson, supra note 6, at 5-9.
See Stratman, supra note 2, at 9-10.

54.

LINDA

H.

EDWARDS,

LEGAL

WRITING

AND

ANALYSIS

209-11

(2003)

(deemphasizing bad facts in brief writing); MAUET, supra note 37, at 114 (suggesting
advocates bury weaknesses in the middle of direct examination narrative).
55. See Stratman, supra note 2, at 8.
56. Id. at 9-10.
57. See id. at 10.
58. Id. at 9-10.
59. Id. at 8-10.
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making reasonable concessions that acknowledge the positive
adverse points and then rebutting them.60
This approach takes a more educational role in brief writing, and
so will explain an adverse authority or argument in the course of
refuting it, on the theory that the risk of greater exposure to the
adverse point is outweighed by the ability to make a full and explicit
rebuttal.61 The goal in this approach is reasonableness, and the
advocate fashions herself and her communication as designed to aid
in the reader's full understanding of the issues, arguments, and
authority in the case. 62 Advocates who use this style will make
concessions on points that do not directly subvert their ultimate goal,
on the theory that this enhances their credibility and gives the
impression that their position is not an extreme, but, rather, a
middle ground that will be more palatable to the judges.63 These
advocates are willing to argue both on and off their opponent's turfbut, overall, they worry less about whose turf they are on.64 They will
concern themselves more with whether the judge understands both
the negative information and its refutation than whether the judge
will sense weakness or qualification.65
III.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON NEGATIVE INFORMATION

There is a substantial body of social science research on the
treatment of negative information, and this research can start
lawyers on the path to resolving the wide divergence of opinion
regarding the treatment of negative information.66 The bulk of this
research focuses on political issues and advertising, as opposed to
law. Nevertheless, the research lends itself to some generalizations
beyond those contexts, and so provides valuable clues about how to
handle negative information in the legal context.
In the nonlegal context, there are two significant bodies of social
science research implicated in the question of how to deal with
negative information in a persuasive message. One, the research into
one-sided versus two-sided messages, tests both the persuasive value
of the message as well as whether the message made the recipient

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8-10.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See generally William J. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some
Contemporary Approaches, 1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (1964).
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resistant to attacks from opponents. 67 The other body of research,
inoculation theory, focuses on making message recipients resistant to
attacks on a persuasive message.68 Inoculation does not make an
argument more persuasive, but rather seeks to make sure that the
audience does not accept an opponent's arguments.69 This aspect of
persuasion-convincing an audience to resist arguments that
contravene an opposing position-is a bit different from developing
and communicating a set of positive justifications for one's own
position.70
There is also a small but growing subset of social science
research devoted to the handling of negative information in legal
advocacy. The research in this area can help supplement the nonlegal
research and facilitate its application to legal contexts. The legal
research, however, is in its infancy and also has some significant
gaps and flaws that require reference to nonlegal studies. The two
areas, legal and nonlegal, are best examined together for the most
comprehensive picture. Taken together, the research supports the
general proposition that, in many situations, there is a strategic
advantage to preemptively raising negative information.
A.

Message Sidedness

Message sidedness refers to whether a persuasive message
contains only positive (or bolstering) information, or whether it
acknowledges or addresses contrary information.71 Research into
message sidedness tests audience reaction to one-sided versus twosided messages.72 One-sided messages simply offer only positive or
bolstering information-only support of the advocated position
without any acknowledgement of the existence of opposing
arguments. 73 In an advertisement for a cold medicine, for example, a
one-sided message would describe the brand as powerful, safe, and

67. See, e.g., Michael Etgar & Stephen A. Goodwin, One-Sided Versus Two-sided
ComparativeMessage Appeals for New Brand Introductions, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 460,
460 (1982).
68. See generally Brogdon, supra note 6, at 444-45.
69. See Stratman, supra note 2, at 10.
70. See McGuire, supra note 66, at 192.
71. JAMES B. STIFF & PAUL A. MONGEAU, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 140 (2d ed.
2003).
72. DANIEL J. O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORIES AND RESEARCH 161 (1990); Erin
Alison Szabo & Michael Pfau, Nuances in Inoculation: Theory and Applications, in
THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 234, 234

(James P. Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).
73. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 140.
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effective, with no negative side effects.74 The advertisement would
not mention of any flaws of the medicine.
Two-sided messages offer support for the advocated position as
well as an acknowledgement of opposing views.75 But two-sided
messages come in a variety of forms and are sometimes difficult to
classify. Researchers have attempted to classify two-sided messages
into two categories: refutational and nonrefutational.76 Two-sided
nonrefutational messages offer only an acknowledgement of opposing
views, with no direct refutation of those views.77 The nonrefutational
messages may follow negative information with positive information,
but they do not directly refute or address the negative information.78
For example, one study involved messages that supported and
criticized the existence of fraternities.79 That study created the twosided message by simply combining the (one-sided) profraternity
message and the (one-sided) antifraternity message, so that the
audience received a balanced view of both sides.So
Two-sided
refutational
messages
offer
not
only
an
acknowledgement of opposing views, but also a refutation of opposing
arguments.8 1 The message may "involve attacking the plausibility of
opposing claims, criticizing the reasoning underlying opposing
arguments, [or] offering evidence. .,to undermine opposing claims,"
but the core characteristic is that it contains some kind of direct
refutation.82 These messages attempt to "remove" the negative
information either by denying the truth of the opposing claims or by
arguing that the negative information is irrelevant.83 Examples of
refutational two-sided messages are: "[s]ome people say this
economic policy will increase unemployment, but that isn't so
because" (direct negation) or "[i]t's true that my client was convicted

74. See Etgar & Goodwin, supra note 67, at 462; see also Daniel J. O'Keefe, The
Persuasive Effects of Message Sidedness Variations: A Cautionary Note Concerning
Allen's (1991) Meta-Analysis, 57 W.J. COMM. 87, 89 (1993).
75. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 140.
76. See id. at 141.
77. Id. at 141; Mike Allen, Meta-Analysis Comparing the Persuasiveness of Onesided and Two-sided Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 390, 392 (1991).
78. See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 141.
79. Ralph L. Rosnow, One-Sided Versus Two-Sided Communication Under Indirect
Awareness of Persuasive Intent, 32 PUB. OPINION Q. 95, 96 (1968).
80. Id.
81. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 140-41 (giving example of negative
political advertising as a two-sided message); Allen, supra note 77, at 392; see also
O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 161; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 234.
82. Daniel J. O'Keefe, How to Handle OpposingArguments in PersuasiveMessages:
A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of One-Sided and Two-Sided Messages, 22
COMM. Y.B. 209, 211 (1999).
83. Id. at 215.
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of robberies in the past, but past convictions are not evidence of guilt
in the current case" (arguing irrelevance).S4
1.

Two-Sided Refutational Messages Are the Most
Effective

As a general matter, the results of the research are quite
consistent. Two-sided refutational messages are more effective
because they cause sustained attitude change that is less vulnerable
to opposing arguments.8 5 In other words, when message recipients
are exposed to two-sided refutational arguments, they are more
likely to be persuaded by the message and less likely to change their
minds when confronted with an opposing viewpoint. On the other
hand, two-sided nonrefutational messages are the least persuasive,
significantly less effective than one-sided messages that ignored
opposing viewpoints entirely.86 In other words, the data suggest that
if a persuader is not going to refute the arguments, it is better to
ignore them entirely.87
However, the line between refutational and nonrefutational
messages is not always clear. For example, researchers have
disagreed over the classification of the advertisement: 'TIT
toothpaste: you may not like its color, but you'll certainly love its nice
fresh taste."88 Similarly, researchers have also disagreed about the
classification of this advertisement: "Although calorie content per...
serving[] is higher than the other premium beers tested, and while
Crick Premium's price is also premium, the net result remains
superior drinking pleasure."9 At first glance, these messages appear
to be nonrefutational in that they do not offer a direct rebuttal of the
negative information.90 However, some researchers have a somewhat
broader view of refutation, finding that messages with even subtle
rebuttal can be refutational.91 Although not directly addressing the
negative information-the color of the toothpaste, the calorie content,
84. Id.
85. See O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 161; PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 178; Allen,
supra note 77, at 396; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 234. Although there is some
variation in the degree of effectiveness, two-sided messages are consistently more
effective notwithstanding audience education level, familiarity with the issue, or
initial attitude toward the topic. See also STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 142. Dr.
O'Keefe concludes that "persuaders are well advised to employ two-sided messages
rather generally." O'KEEFE, supranote 72, at 162.
86. STIFF & MONGEAU, supranote 71, at 141-42.
87. Id.
88. O'Keefe, supra note 75, at 89. O'Keefe disagreed with Allen's classification of
the toothpaste advertisements as refutational. Allen, supra note 77, at 398.
89. Etgar & Goodwin, supra note 67, at 462; see also O'Keefe, supra note 75, at 89.
90. O'Keefe, supranote 82, at 211.
91. Allen, supra note 77, at 393, 396.
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or the price of the beer-there is arguably some rebuttal contained in
these messages. 92 Specifically, both messages seek to overcome the
negative information by referencing a countervailing positive
attribute. Both messages also could be read to contain a subtle
argument about relevance: you may not like the color, but does that
really matter more than the taste of toothpaste? Or, isn't overall
drinking pleasure worth more calories and a higher price? The Crick
beer advertisement could even be interpreted as reframing a
negative as a positive, emphasizing the "premium" price of the beer
to appeal to status-conscious beer drinkers.
Messages like these muddy the waters of the two-sided message
research a bit. As a general matter, directly refutational two-sided
messages have a stronger effect than indirectly refutational twosided messages, but some indirectly refutational two-sided messages
outperform one-sided messages.93 The VIT toothpaste advertisement,
for example, that acknowledged the ugly color but argued that the
taste was great, outperformed the one-sided advertisement in that
study, bringing it closer in persuasive effect to a two-sided
refutational argument. 94 Similarly, the Crick Beer advertisement
that acknowledged the "premium" price but argued that Crick
nevertheless provided overall "superior drinking pleasure" also
outperformed the one-sided advertisement.95 This suggests that less
direct refutation has some persuasive power. However, the studies
show inconsistent results for similar indirectly refutational two-sided
6
messages.9

92. Another example is Bill Clinton's acknowledgement during the 1992
Presidential campaign that he had not worked a perfect transformation of Arkansas as
governor. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 113. Instead, in his speech accepting his party's
presidential nomination, Clinton acknowledged that there was no "Arkansas miracle,"
and then went on to extol his achievements as governor. Id. This acknowledged the
potential for criticism, while noting that much good was done in Arkansas nonetheless.
A direct refutation would have been an argument that what Clinton did in Arkansas
was a miraculous transformation; nevertheless, there is some refutation inherent in
Clinton's defense of his achievements as governor.
93. See supra note 67-84.
94. See Allen, supra note 77, at 397; O'Keefe, supra note 74, at 91.
95. Etgar & Goodwin, supra note 67, at 462-63.
96. In yet another toothpaste advertisement, for the fictional Shield toothpaste, a
one-sided advertisement outperformed this two-sided advertisement: "[A]lthough
Shield [toothpaste] was found to be only about average in tests of whitening ability, its
fluorigard formula was preferred in taste tests." George E. Belch, An Examination of
Comparative and Noncomparative Television Commercials: The Effects of Claim
Variation and Repetition on Cognitive Response and Message Acceptance, 18 J.
MARKETING RES. 333, 348 (1981). The Shield toothpaste advertisement seems to
contain the same kind of subtle refutation as the VIT and Crick advertisements.
However, the Shield toothpaste advertisement was run as a television advertisement,
whereas the VIT toothpaste and Crick Beer advertisements were print
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In terms of the structure of a two-sided persuasive message, it is
clear that beginning with refutation decreases persuasive value. Not
surprisingly, the studies show that two-sided messages are less
effective if all of the refutational material is presented first.97 The
best persuasive results occurred when the refutational arguments
were interwoven with the supporting arguments. 98 However, the
news about whether to lead with an entirely supportive statement is
a bit surprising (and less clear). Some studies report that leading
with supporting information in a two-sided message and leaving all
refutational information for the end is most effective.99 In an even
later meta-analysisloo of a series of studies, however, neither type of
two-sided message-refutational or nonrefutational--enjoyed a
persuasive advantage over one-sided messages when the two sided
messages discussed all positive information first.101
2.

Why Are Two-Sided Messages So Effective?

The advantages of two-sided messages can be explained in a
number of ways. Like lawyers, social scientists theorize that the
credibility of the message source is at the heart of the power of twosided messages, but there are other important reasons as well.102
The boost that two-sided messages offer to the credibility of the
message source stems from the audience's expectations. Most people
expect issues to have two sides and expect persuaders to address
both sides.1o3 This theory is borne out in the studies, which find
overall that both refutational and nonrefutational two-sided
messages lead the audience to perceive the message source as more
10 4
credible and knowledgeable than one-sided messages.

Credibility also explains the advantage of refutational two-sided
messages over nonrefutational. The theory is that if the persuader
advertisements. See id. Researchers have posited that written persuasive messages
may be more effective because they allow the recipients greater opportunity to process
the message and dwell on the credibility of the message source. Id. at 346. Both Allen
and O'Keefe characterize the Shield toothpaste advertisement as nonrefutational. See
Allen, supra note 77, at 397; O'Keefe, supra note 74, at 91.
97. O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 162; O'Keefe, supra note 82, at 226.
98. O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 162; O'Keefe, supra note 82, at 226.
99. O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 162.
100. Meta-analysis uses data from multiple studies to derive a more complete
picture of overall findings. Mark A. Hamilton & John E. Hunter, A Framework for
Understanding:Meta-Analyses of the PersuasionLiterature, in PERSUASION: ADVANCES

THROUGH META-ANALYSIS 1, 2-3 (Mike Allen & Raymond W. Preiss eds., 1998).
101. O'Keefe, supra note 82, at 226.
102. SMITH, supra note 31, at 101-02 (citing Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos and Legal
Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85 (1994)); STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 140-41.
103. See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 139-41.
104. O'Keefe, supra note 82, at 226.
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raises, but does not rebut, opposing arguments, message recipients
tend to discount the persuader's credibility and expertise.105 In other
words, message recipients confronted with an unrebutted opposing
view will assume that the persuader, while perhaps more
knowledgeable than someone who seems to know only the supporting
view, does not have the requisite expertise to adequately address the
opposing view. The audience may view the speaker who raises
opposing views without rebuttal as less knowledgeable, less fair, and
less honest than one who has addressed opposing viewpoints.106
This aspect of credibility-the expectation that a true expert
would be able to rebut opposing views-appears to be most important
for political and social messages. For political and social messages,
such as antismoking campaigns, messages about political candidates,
and messages about the political status of countries like Tibet,
directly refutational two-sided messages significantly enhanced the
credibility of the message source.107 On the other hand, in those
contexts nonrefutational (or indirectly refutational) two-sided
messages did not enhance credibility.108 Thus, in the political or
social arena the ability to rebut opposing views is essential to
credibility.
Interestingly, the opposite is true in commercial advertising. In
advertising, credibility is enhanced by merely raising opposing views;
to enjoy the credibility boost of a two-sided message, there is no need
to rebut the opposing views. In the studies involving commercial
advertisements, when a message source is perceived by the audience
as trying to sell something, nonrefutational two-sided messages
resulted in greater perceived credibility than one-sided messages.109
But, refutational two-sided messages did not result in greater
perceived credibility than one-sided messages.110 A possible reason
for this is that when the message source is perceived as having "an
axe to grind," the rebuttal of the two-sided message is viewed
skeptically because it comes from a biased source seeking to sell
something to the audience, as opposed to an objective rebuttal by a
scholar."'
Another widely embraced theory supporting the superiority of
two-sided messages focuses on the depth of thought stimulated by
105. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 141.
106. Allen, supra note 77, at 392. The negative evaluation of a speaker's credibility
is referred to as the "discounting hypothesis" because the audience discounts the
speaker's message based on a negative credibility assessment. Id.
107. See generally O'Keefe, supra note 82.
108. Id. at 226.
109. Id. at 226-27.
110. Id. at 226.
111. Allen, supra note 77, at 392 (explaining the "discounting hypothesis").
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two-sided messages. People are more motivated to think about the
content of messages when the message is more stimulating and the
source of the message is perceived as more credible.112 A two-sided
message appears well-informed and balanced.113 This leads people to
think more favorably about the ultimate message and makes them
more likely to change their minds to agree with the message.14
Finally, one of the primary theories explaining the effectiveness
of two-sided messages is called inoculation.115 Inoculation posits that
two-sided messages work because they make the message recipient
able to resist and reject attacks on the message.1' 6 Inoculation theory
is discussed at length in subpart B.
B.

Inoculation Theory

Proponents of preemptive disclosure of negative information in
the trial context frequently rely on the social science theory of
inoculation to support their view that the default position should be
to offer bad evidence on direct examination, before the opponent has
the opportunity to dramatize it.117 But the history of inoculation and
the studies upon which the theory is based call for a nuanced
approach to negative information. Consistent with data regarding
two-sided messages, inoculation studies show that raising and
refuting adverse information works better than a wholly positive
message to insulate message recipients from later attacks on the
message." 8 However, the comparison between inoculation and posthoc refutation is a bit less conclusive. Inoculation is superior in some
respects to post-hoc refutation, but only in certain circumstances.
1. How Inoculation Works
The theory of inoculation is based on the idea that advocates can
make the recipient of a persuasive message "resistant" to opposing
arguments, much like a vaccination makes a patient resistant to
disease.119 In an inoculation message, the message recipient is

112. Mike Allen, Comparing the Persuasive Effectiveness of One and Two-Sided
Message, in PERSUASION: ADVANCES THROUGH META-ANALYSIs 87, 87-88 (Mike Allen
& Raymond W. Preiss eds., 1998).
113. Id.
114. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 142.
115. See generally Brogdon, supra note 6; Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the
Courtroom: Trying Cases Without Knowing What Works or Why, 101 YALE L.J. 1177,
1187-88 (1992).
116. Id.
117. Brogdon, supra note 6, at 447 (citing trial consultant Donald Vinson); Saks,
supra note 115, at 1187-88 (citing inoculation studies).
118. See Saks, supra note 115, at 1187-90.
119. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125.
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exposed to a weakened version of arguments against the persuasive
message, coupled with appropriate refutation of those opposing
arguments. 120 The theory is that introducing a "small dose" of a
message contrary to the persuader's position makes the message
recipient immune to attacks from the opposing side.121 Inoculation
works because the introduction of a small dose of the opposing
argument induces the message recipient to generate arguments that
refute the opposing argument, the intellectual equivalent of
producing antibodies.122 Once the message recipient generates
refutational arguments, she will be less likely to accept the opposing
argument when it is presented to her by the opposing side because
she will already have a cache of ammunition with which to resist the
opposing argument.23
Inoculation does not focus on the persuasive value of the
message; rather, the focus of inoculation is in making the recipient
resistant to attack.124 In other words, unlike most persuasive
message strategies, inoculation strategy is not designed to change
one's beliefs, but to stop a recipient from changing a belief based on a
competing message.125 The reason for this becomes clear when the
history of inoculation research is examined. The research evolved in
the aftermath of the Korean War, when many American prisoners in
North Korean camps seemed to have trouble defending basic
American
democratic
values
and
resisting
Communist
indoctrination.126 The success of North Korean indoctrination raised
questions about how and why soldiers who embraced and fought for
American cultural values could be persuaded to reject them merely
by enemy proselytizing.127 Early inoculation theory suggested that it
was the very strength and unquestionable nature of the values that
lay at the root of the problem.128 The indoctrination was successful
because until their imprisonment, the American prisoners had never

120. Id.
121. Id.; O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 179; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 234.
122. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125.
123. Id. ("Counterarguing the oppositional message in one's own mind should lead
to strengthening of initial attitude and increased resistance to persuasion.").
124. See generally Michael Pfau, Steve Van Bockern & Jong Geun Kang, Use of
Inoculation to Promote Resistance to Smoking InitiationAmong Adolescents, 59 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 213 (1992).
125. Id. at 214, 218; Michael Pfau & Michael Burgoon, Inoculation in Political
Campaign Communication, 15 HUMAN COMM. RES. 91, 92 (1988) (stating that
inoculation is a "resistance strategy" designed to "strengthen existing attitudes against
change"); see also Wei-Kuo Lin, Inoculation to Resist Attacks, 15 ASIAN J. COMM. 85, 86
(2005).
126. Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 234.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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had to defend these values against attack.129 Much like a baby raised
in an aseptic environment, they had not built up an "immunity" to
counter-arguments and were more vulnerable to them.130 Therefore,
the early research into inoculation theory sought to strengthen
message recipients' existing attitude against change; in other words,
it targeted message recipients who believed in something and tried to
insulate those beliefs from attack.131
Because of this history, the early inoculation research focused on
how to make widely held beliefs-i.e., cultural truisms-more
resistant to attack.132 In early studies, researchers tested what kind
of "pretreatments," if any, would make subjects more immune to
attacks on the truisms.133 Pretreatments refer to the information
subjects are exposed to prior to being exposed to attacks on the
truism. In one experiment, subjects were divided so that one group
read only arguments supporting the truism, a second group was
exposed to an attack on the truism and read a refutation of that
attack, a third group was exposed to an attack on the truism and was
asked to write a refutation of that attack, and a fourth group received
no information.134 All groups were then subjected to a subsequent
attack on the truism.
When confronted with the subsequent attack on the truism,
those who had been exposed to an attack and then a written
refutation demonstrated the highest resistance to later attacks and
were most likely to cling to belief in the truism.135 Those who read
the already-prepared refutational statement were more resistant to
the later attacks than those who had written their own refutations,
but those who wrote the refutations were more resistant than those
who had read only the supporting statements or those who received
no information.136 In fact, the research demonstrated that the group

129. Id.; O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 180.
130. O'KEEFE, supranote 72, at 179; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 234.
131. See Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 92.
132. OKEEFE, supra note 72, at 180; PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125; McGuire,
supra note 66, at 201. Cultural truisms are defined as "beliefs that are so widely
shared within the person's social milieu that he would not have heard them attacked,
and indeed, would doubt that an attack were possible." O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 180.
133. McGuire, supranote 66, at 200-01; Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 92.
134. McGuire, supra note 66, at 203-05. Early research focused on cultural truisms,
such as "people should brush [their] teeth after every meal" and "penicillin ha[s] been,
almost without exception, of great benefit to mankind." Id. at 201; O'KEEFE, supra
note 72, at 180; PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125; STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at
288; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235.
135. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125; O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 180.
136. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 288; McGuire, supra note 66, at 206-07.
The lesser inoculation effect exhibited by those who had to write their own refutations
suggests that leaving arguments or conclusions implicit, an "enthymeme" in classical
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reading only the supporting arguments exhibited about the same
level of resistance to attack on the truism as those who received no
information at all-in other words, a support-only argument was
roughly as effective as no argument at all. 137
In the context of cultural truisms, the inoculation effect is quite
strong; researchers describe it as "robust."138 The effect is so strong
that an inoculation message can create generalized resistance to a
wide variety of attacks on the belief-even attacks different from the
ones refuted by the original inoculation message. 139 For example, in a
later experiment, researchers studied whether the inoculation effect
would occur if the subjects were exposed to subsequent attacks
different from the attacks refuted in the original message. In this
experiment, all subjects read a message containing attacks on the
truism and refutation of the attacks.140 All were then exposed to
subsequent attacks on the truism. However, one set of subjects was
exposed to subsequent attacks that were the same as the attacks
refuted in the original message ("refutational-same" message).141 The
other group was exposed to different subsequent attacks
("refutational-different" message).142 The study demonstrated that
inoculation messages seem to confer resistance to a wide variety of
attack messages, not just to the attack messages that were the
subject of the original message. 143 Those who received inoculation
messages were not only more resistant to the particular attack to
which they had been exposed, but exhibited overall resistance to a
variety of novel attacks on the truism.144
Later research expanded inoculation beyond cultural truisms.
The results of these experiments demonstrated that there is an
inoculation effect with more controversial topics, but the effect is
weaker.145 For example, inoculation has been tested a number of
times in the context of political advertising, where attack messages
rhetoric, is a risky persuasive strategy. See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 14243, 288.
137. McGuire, supra note 66, at 206-07.
138. Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 240-41.
139. O'KEEFE, supranote 72, at 181; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235-36 (noting
that inoculation "spreads a 'broad blanket of protection against specific
counterarguments"') (quoting Michael Pfau, The Inoculation Model of Resistance to
Influence, in 13 PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES: ADVANCES IN PERSUASION

137-38 (George A. Barnett & Frankin J. Boster eds., 1997)).
140. McGuire, supra note 66, at 208.
141. Id. at 202, 208-09.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 209.
144. Id. at 205; O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 181; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at
235-36.
145.

STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 289.
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are relatively common. 146 In one study, which tested inoculation in
the 1986 political campaign between Republican James Abdnor and
Democrat Tom Daschle, researchers estimated that South Dakota
residents had been exposed to more than three hundred political
advertisements on behalf of the two candidates.147 In this setting, the
beliefs of the voters had already been the targets of a variety of
persuasive messages, both negative and positive, about both
candidates, a setting hardly analogous to an "aseptic" environment.
Even in this context, the inoculation effect was significant, with
inoculated message recipients showing resistance to the message in
the attack advertisements.148 Voters exposed to the inoculation
message were less supportive of an opponent's attack advertisements
and less likely to change their attitudes in favor of the candidate
employing the attack advertisements.149 The inoculation effect
occurred regardless of whether the inoculation message addressed
the issue raised in the attack advertisement or attempted to
inoculate on a wholly different issue.150 The resistance to the attack
advertisements for those recipients who received a refutational-same
message did not differ significantly from those who received a
refutational-different message.151 And those recipients who received
an inoculation message, whether the same or novel, showed more
resistance to attack advertisements than the recipients who received

no inoculation at

all.152

In the study, however, researchers determined that the
inoculation effect "decays over time."153 Researchers tested time
intervals of one, two, and three weeks, and determined that
inoculation is stronger at one week than either two or three, and
stronger at two than at three weeks.154 This suggests that the
inoculation effect "wears off' at some point, and is not as strong as
the time lapse between the inoculation message and the attack

146. See, e.g., Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 91; Michael Pfau, Henry C.
Kenski, Michael Nitz & John Sorenson, Efficacy of Inoculation Strategies in Promoting
Resistance to Political Attack Messages: Application to Direct Mail, 57 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 25 (1990).

147. Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 95 (citing John J. Fialka, Intense
Mudslinging in South Dakota Senate Race Provokes Many to Favor Restricting
PoliticalAds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1986).
148. Id. at 101.
149. Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 244-45 (citing Pfau & Burgoon, supra note
125).
150. Id.; see also Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 93, 100-01.
151. Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 101.
152. Id. at 101
153. Id. at 101-02.
154. Id. at 101-03.
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increases.155 Interestingly, though, there was no significant
difference in the time effect between same and novel inoculation
messages.1l6 On the other hand, another study, which involved
adolescent subjects, showed that the inoculation response continued
over a period of more than eight months.157 The study did not say,
however, whether the response was weakened over time; only that
the effect continued.158
Not surprisingly, inoculation messages seemed to work best
overall with those recipients who already had strong beliefs. For
example, in the political advertising context, the inoculation effect
was strongest with those message recipients who identified strongly
with a political party, and less effective among those who identified
weakly with a party, who did not identify at all, or who claimed
identification with one party but were supporting the candidate of
the other party ("crossovers"). 159 Interestingly, refutational- same
messages seemed most effective with strong party identifiers,
whereas inoculation novel messages worked with both strong
identifiers and crossovers.1 60
In addition to creating a shield around a message recipient,
inoculation also has another positive persuasive effect. In the
commercial advertising context, inoculation messages have been
shown to suppress a message recipient's usual counter-argument
reaction to a purely supporting message. 1 6' Message recipients are
often skeptical of a one-sided persuasive message and will react to
wholly positive advocacy by generating counter-arguments to the
positive message. This is particularly true if the message recipient is
somehow forewarned that a persuasive message or argument is
coming her way, such as: "You will soon hear a message advocating
that quitting smoking will improve your health."162 This type of
forewarning tends to lead most people to generate arguments against
the message. Inoculation appears to stop this process, which means it
also has some strengthening effect on the original persuasive
message.

155. See id. at 102.
156. Id.
157. Pfau, Van Bockern & Geun Kang, supra note 124, at 227.
158. See id.
159. Pfau & Burgoon, supra note 125, at 103-05, 107.
160. Id. at 104.
161. Szabo & Pfau, supranote 72, at 244.
162. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 123. When people are told that they will soon be
exposed to a persuasive message, particularly if it is a message with which they are
likely to disagree, they tend to generate counter-arguments in opposition to the
persuasive message. Forewarning in this way makes a subsequent persuasive message
much less likely to succeed. Id. at 123.
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Notably, however, research shows only "modest" support for the
superiority of inoculation strategy over post-hoc refutation.163 In
another political advertising study focused on the Bush/Dukakis
presidential campaign of 1988, researchers used inoculation
messages, inoculation-plus-reinforcement messages, and post-hoc
refutation to counter attacks on a candidate's position and
character.164 The inoculation-plus-reinforcement messages consisted
of an initial inoculation message followed later by additional
reinforcing inoculation messages, all of which preceded the attacking
message. 165
The researchers tested the efficacy of the inoculation messages
based on two variables: the attitudes of message recipients regarding
the candidate in the attack advertisement and their attitudes
regarding the position advocated in the attack advertisement.166 To
do this, the researchers used two types of attacking messages, one
attacking the candidate's position on an issue and the other
attacking the candidate on character.167 The Bush attack messages
criticized "Dukakis for being weak on crime [issue] and for deception
involving his record as Governor of Massachusetts [character]."168
The Dukakis attack messages criticized "Bush for his support of
agricultural policies that... hurt rural America [issue] and for
insensitivity to" average working people (character).169
The study showed that inoculation was clearly superior to posthoc refutation with respect to strong political party identifiers, or
people who already had strongly formed beliefs.170 Among weak party
identifiers, however, inoculation alone was actually inferior to
inoculation-plus-reinforcement and post-hoc refutation in deflecting
issue attack messages.171 On the other hand, inoculation and
inoculation-plus-reinforcement were superior in deflecting the
character attack messages.172 So, overall, inoculation had "some
advantage" over post-hoc refutation with respect to the message
recipients' attitude toward the character of the candidates in the

163. Pfau et al., supra note 146, at 38.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 32-33. This was meant to test whether inoculation plus reinforcement
would stop the 'wearing off of the inoculation effect noted in the earlier study. It did
not. Id. at 38.
166. See id. at 33.
167. Id. at 31.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 39. See generally STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 291; Szabo &
Pfau, supranote 72, at 245.
171. Pfau et al., supra note 146, at 39.
172. Id.
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attack advertisements;173 it had no advantage over post-hoc
refutation with respect to the message recipients' attitude toward the
position advocated in the attack.174 Unfortunately, researchers offer
no theory as to why there should be this difference in inoculation
effect between issue and character.
2. Why Does Inoculation Work?
The key to inoculation is the warning of the impending attack, or
"threat," combined with the refutation of the attack.175 Refutation
alone is not sufficient to produce the inoculation response.176 The two
components work in tandem-for the inoculation response to occur,
challenges must be explicitly raised and then answered. 177
The key to the inoculation response is "threat."178 This reveals
that the inoculation process is primarily emotional, and only
secondarily cognitive.179 The threat creates the motivation: the
raising of a weak counter-argument to the position advocated
produces an implied challenge or threat to the position.180 This threat
stimulates the recipient to generate arguments that refute the
counter-arguments; the recipient becomes motivated to counter the
threat.1s1 In other words, when people read a set of supporting
arguments, they experience a "threat" or "dissonance" when
presented with an opposing viewpoint. 182 This threat motivates them
to develop or seek out refutational arguments; people want to resolve
dissonance and will gravitate toward a path that allows them to
alleviate the threat to the position advocated.83 For example, in a
study testing whether inoculation would have any effect on student
response to peer pressure to begin smoking, the threat of the
inoculation message was a warning that "as a result of significant

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
See Lin, supra note 125, at 86.
Pfau, Van Bockern & Geun Kang, supra note 124, at 215.
Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235-37.
Id. at 235.

181.

O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 182; PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125 (arguing that

"inoculation works by introducing a threat to a person's belief system and then
providing a way for individuals to cope with the threat"); Lin, supra note 125, at 86
(noting that threat is a "motivational trigger' inducing the message recipient to bolster
his or her belief); Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235.
182.

See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 289.

183.

See id.
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peer pressure... many of them would become uncertain about
smoking, and some would change their minds and try smoking."1s4
The importance of the feeling of a threat to a position can explain
why the inoculation effect is stronger in situations involving cultural
truisms. Because the threat is felt so much more intensely when the
message recipient agrees with the advocated position, the message
recipient will feel greater motivation to resolve the dissonance
created by the opposing position.185 The importance of a threat also
explains why inoculation regarding one potential weakness provides
a wide umbrella of protection against novel attacks on other
weaknesses.186
The refutation portion of the inoculation message serves a more
cognitive, as opposed to emotional, purpose. The refutation gives the
message recipient an example of how to resist the attack. Often, the
refutation explicitly reiterates the attacks. For example, in the
smoking study, the refutation began by raising specific attacks on the
belief that smoking is bad.187 Students were told that they might, in
the future, hear that smoking is "cool" and that a person can try
smoking without becoming a regular smoker.188 These explicit
attacks were then directly negated.189
Cognitively, the refutational argument gives the message
recipient the capability (as opposed to motivation) to refute the
counter-argument; it gives the message recipient a partial "script" for
refutation of counter-arguments.1 9o The preemptive quality of
inoculation also gives the persuader the opportunity to reframe the
attack arguments before the opposition has an opportunity to present
them.191
Largely because the inoculation effect is consistently generalized
beyond the "script" provided, researchers have focused on motivation
as the critical component.192 In fact, there is some research that
suggests that a warning of possible counter-attack alone, or a
message recipient's generalized awareness that an argument is
vulnerable, can be enough to stimulate the recipient to create
refutational arguments.193 Threat alone, however, risks a weaker
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
threat
193.

Pfau, Van Bockern & Geun Kang, supra note 124, at 219.
See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 289.
See Pfau et al., supra note 146, at 29.
Pfau, Van Bockern & Geun Kang, supra note 124, at 219.
See id.
See id.
See Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235.
PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 126.
O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 182; Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 235-36 (noting
is the "most integral" of the two components of inoculation).
See O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 182.
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inoculation response, and depends greatly on the level of a message
recipient's involvement in the issue. Involvement is a complex
phenomenon in social science, but, to oversimplify, it refers to the
level of personal relevance a message has for the message
recipient.194 A message recipient who is deeply involved in the issue
of the message is likely to have a stronger inoculation response-that
is, she will exhibit greater resistance to attacks on the message.195
However, research suggests that there is an "optimal level" of
recipient involvement in an issue required for the inoculation effect
to occur.19 6 For example, if the message recipient is either too
involved or not involved enough, inoculation may have a negligible
impact because the recipient's motivation will be unaffected by the
two-sided argument.197
In sum, the inoculation effect occurs when an advocate
preemptively raises a negative issue within a persuasive message.
Inoculation puts a "shield" over the message recipient, making her
resistant to attacks on the persuasive message. Consistent with the
two-sided message research, inoculation creates the strongest shield
when accompanied by refutation of the negative information. While
the inoculation shield is strongest with message recipients who
already agree with the persuasive message, it is nevertheless present
even with message recipients who are undecided. Overall, when an
advocate for a controversial position makes even a weak refutational
argument in addition to supporting arguments, the audience is more
resistant to multiple counter-arguments by the other side.198

194.

Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411,

434; see STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 181-83. For example, college students
confronted with the possibility of tuition hikes at their school feel high involvement;
they feel less involvement when confronted with the possibility of tuition hikes at a
distant or obscure university. See id. at 183.
195. See Lin, supra note 125, at 97.
196. See Szabo & Pfau, supra note 72, at 237.
197. See id. at 237, 239. Up to a point, higher involvement will increase the
inoculation effect because a person who has deeper involvement in an issue is more
likely to "acknowledge the vulnerability of one's attitudes and act to bolster them."
Lin, supra note 125, at 90. A person with deeper involvement is also more likely to
expend the energy necessary to bolster the belief. Id.
198. See O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 180-81; Szabo & Pfau, supranote 72, at 236; see
also PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 125 (arguing "inoculation spreads a broad blanket of
protection both against specific counterarguments raised in refutational pre-emption
and against those counterarguments not raised") (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
Pfau et al., supra note 146, at 29 (noting "inoculation promotes resistance to both same
and different counterarguments").
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IV. MESSAGE SIDEDNESS AND INOCULATION IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Within the social science discipline of persuasion, there has also
been growing interest in scientifically studying persuasion in law.
There are several studies that focus on the use of negative
information in the legal context. Most of the studies in this nascent
area of the discipline are in the trial context, but there is one study in
the persuasive writing context. The small number and limited nature
of the studies means it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from
them, but nevertheless they can help legal advocates supplement and
refine their application of the persuasion science to law.
A.

Brief Writing

The inoculation response has been tested and explored in the law
context by Professor James Stratman.199 Professor Stratman sought
to compare the rhetorical effectiveness of what he refers to as the
"adversarial" approach with the "scholarly" approach to dealing with
adverse arguments and authority in legal briefs.200
Professor Stratman tested the two approaches using "thinkaloud" protocols.201 He asked attorneys writing a brief in an appellate
case to record their thought processes, and then asked the court
clerks to record their thought processes while reading the briefs.202
He then analyzed the briefs and the protocols to determine whether
the attorneys used the adversarial or scholarly approach, and how
the judicial clerks reacted to the different approaches.203
The case concerned whether the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources (DER), a state agency, can require that a
company against whom it has assessed a fine must put the fine
money in escrow before the company is permitted to appeal.204 In the
case, the DER had fined a company referred to as 'Magic Mining,"
and Magic Mining had challenged DER's right to require an escrow
deposit of the fines.205 Magic Mining had lost on this issue before the
commonwealth court and appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme

199. See Stratman, supra note 2.
200. Id. at 7-13.
201. Id. at 18-23.
202. Id.
203. Id. None of the judges approached by Strat-man could participate in the study
for a variety of reasons. Id. at 21. As a result, Stratman used court clerks as his
"judicial" readers. Id.
204. Id. at 25-26.
205. Id.
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Court.206 Magic Mining argued that the deposit requirement violated
its rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.207
Professor Stratman observed that both DER and Magic Mining
employed mostly adversarial or one-sided argumentation in their
briefs.208 The attorneys almost never qualified their arguments of
supporting case law.209 One attorney, an experienced trial advocate,
seemed unable to consider or accept the legitimacy of any opposing
views, and this hampered his ability to construct convincing
refutations.210 He appeared to believe that the lower court was
unfairly predisposed against his client and felt that he must
overwhelm the supreme court with arguments undermining the
decision below.211
The think-aloud protocols of the clerks (the brief readers)
demonstrated that the one-sided argumentation favored by the
attorneys was not effective.212 The clerks were largely skeptical of the
one-sided arguments and not persuaded by the briefs.213 The thinkaloud protocols showed that the clerks interpreted the one-sided
arguments as unfair to the other side and as less valuable for their
failure to account for other views.214 The clerks eventually rejected as
irrelevant or inapplicable roughly seventy percent of the supporting
cases cited in the briefs.215
Professor Stratman's article analyzes in depth only a portion of
the appellant's brief dealing with adverse arguments and
information.216 Notably, the adverse authority dealt with in this
portion of the brief is the commonwealth court opinion, the lower
court from which the appeal was taken.217 In Professor Stratman's
view, this portion of the appellant's brief demonstrates one-sided
argumentation because the arguments make no concession regarding
the reasonableness of the opinion below, opting instead to attack it at
every juncture.218 Of course, the job of the appellant is to point out
error in the decision below, but Professor Stratman's argument is
that the appellant does so in a manner that suggests that the court
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 46-47.
See id.
Id. at 42-44.
Id. at 43-44.
Seeid. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-31.
Id. at 27-30.
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below got everything wrong.219 In one section, for example, the
appellant focuses on two cases relied on by the commonwealth court
involving the constitutional right to a jury trial.220 He argues that the
cases are inapposite because they involve the constitutional jury trial
right and not the constitutional right to appeal.221 These discussions
contain no language conceding that the jury trial cases might be
(even superficially) analogous to a case about the right to appeal.222
The appellant also attributes to the lower court certain
assumptions and contentions that it is not clear the court made, and
then vehemently attacks these assumptions.223 In this part of the
brief, the tone toward the lower court borders on disrespectful and
even a bit sarcastic.224 This approach to negative information is not
well-received by the clerks, who react to the appellant's arguments
with skepticism.225 In fact, Professor Stratman notes that the onesided approach resulted in a boomerang effect and led the clerks to a
conclusion opposite the one advocated.226
Professor Stratman's study has much useful information for the
persuasive legal writer, particularly what it suggests about the
efficacy of a two-sided inoculation approach in the persuasive legal
writing context and the persuasive advantage of a more educational,
concessionary approach.227 It also offers some much needed caution
against the advocate's trap-the inability to see the merit of the
opposing side's arguments-that is so easy to fall into.228 Indeed, this

is what Professor Stratman focuses on in his conclusion: the possible
origins of the one-sided approach to brief writing, for which he offers
a number of interesting explanations.229
There are some caveats to using Professor Stratman's study to
draw definitive conclusions about how best to handle negative
information in a brief. It is one study about one case, so it is rather
limited in scope. Moreover, any conclusions drawn about the overall
negative impact of the one-sided argumentation techniques must be
evaluated in light of the fact that, at least in part, the "adverse"
authority that was the target of the one-sided technique analyzed
219. See id.
220. Id. at 28-30.
221. Id. at 28-29.
222. Id. at 29.
223. Id. at 30.
224. Id. at 30-31, 35-36.
225. Id.at 38-39, 41.
226. Id. at 42. Stratman believes that the clerks' "backlash" reaction to appellant's
argument stems from appellant's failure to make concessions to the lower court. Id.
227. Id. at 42-46.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 47.
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was the lower court opinion, a body of authority to which judges and
clerks will give far greater deference than, for example, an
opponent's brief.230 It would be reasonable to conclude that judges
and clerks might view a one-sided attack on an adversary's argument
differently from an attack on a judicial opinion.231 Readers might
expect and find persuasive a very adversarial attack on arguments
made by opposing counsel.
Finally,
despite
Professor
Stratman's
statement
that
"[i]dentifying whether a specific case in a brief is given a one- or twosided analysis is a fairly easy judgment to make," the difference can
be difficult to pin down.232 Professor Stratman cites three criteria for
his judgment that the appellant's refutation of adverse material is
one-sided: (1) the argument makes no concession that the adverse
authority relied upon might have some applicability; (2) the
argument insinuates points, rather than closely analyzing material
from the court below; and (3) the argument avoids any concession
that the lower court decision might be correct in some respects. 233
However, the excerpt provided also has some aspects of a twosided message, in the sense that it directly raises and addresses the
contrary authority and provides a direct and somewhat lengthy
refutation of its inapplicability.234 For example, the advocate directly
refers to and cites the two jury-trial cases relied upon by the
commonwealth court, explaining what they hold and how the court
below relied upon them.235 He then takes several paragraphs to
explain why, in his view, the cases are distinguishable.236
The problem is that although the appellant distinguishes the two
jury-trial cases relied upon by the court below by arguing that they
involve the right to jury trial and not the right to appeal, the lawyer
never explains "why this difference is legally sufficient"-or why it
should change the outcome in the case before the court. 237 The failure
to explain the relevance of a distinguishing fact is widely recognized
as a mistake in persuasive legal writing-one professor calls it
"myopic vision"-and legal writing texts routinely caution law

230. See id. at 42.
231. See id. at 29. Professor Stratman acknowledged the deference problems, but,
nevertheless, he uses the example of the critique of the lower court opinion to
generalize about the effectiveness of the one-sided approach. Id. at 42.
232. Id. at 43.
233. See id. at 27-31.
234. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (O'Keefe's definition of
refutational two-sided message).
235. Stratman, supra note 2, at 28-29.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 29.
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students against it.238 Thus, the characterization of this strategy as a
legitimate strategic choice is not quite fair. Moreover, it isn't entirely
one-sided. Because the appellant's treatment of the jury-trial cases in
the Magic Mining litigation raises negative information without
effective refutation,239 the appellant's approach may be more
analogous to a two-sided nonrefutational argument-which social
science shows to be largely unpersuasive-than a one-sided
argument. 240 It may be that the arguments fail not because they are
one-sided, but because they do not offer an effective refutation.
In the same vein, what Professor Stratman characterizes as the
lawyer's one sidedness in imputing certain conclusions to the lower
court 241 can also be seen as a mistake--"myopia" is a good word here,
too-that most lawyers and scholars of advocacy would counsel
against. For example, the lawyer mischaracterizes the lower court as
having stated that constitutionally permitted appeals should not be
allowed to "frustrate" the DER's enforcement of the environmental
laws because the environmental laws serve the public interest.242
This characterization of the lower court's reasoning takes a piece of
quoted material out of context, and thus does not present a fair
description of what the lower court said.243
Moreover, the characterization is also disrespectful in that it
implies that the lower court views the constitutional right to appeal
as "frustrating" to law enforcement and the public interest, as though
the lower court finds the constitutional right to appeal to be
something of an annoying technicality that thwarts the public
interest.244 That readers reacted unfavorably to this as well as other
similar characterizations is not surprising, and most brief-writers
and texts would recommend against such a strategy. 245 Again, it is
important here that the adverse authority attacked is that of the
lower court, which advocates almost universally perceive as
warranting more respect and deference than the opposing side. So it
may not be correct to attribute the failure of the brief to persuade to
a particular, conscious "adversarial" strategy, as much as it should be
attributed to lawyer error.

238.

Robbins, supra note 33, at 516-18; see also FONTHAM, VITIELLO, & MILLER,

supra note 50, at 142-43; LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL

WRITING HANDBOOK 496 (4th ed. 2006).
239. Stratman, supra note 2, at 28-29.
240. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
241. Stratman, supra note 2, at 30-31.
242. Id. at 30.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See BEAZLEY, supra note 32, at 181-82; DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 44, at
259; SMITH, supra note 31, at 116-17.
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The blurring of the "adversarial" approach with what many
appellate advocates would recognize as strategic mistakes
recommends caution in generalizing too widely from Professor
Stratman's interesting study about how to treat negative
information. However, the study does make an important point about
the "myopia" that can result from becoming too deeply embedded
with the client's position and how that can lead to ineffective brief
6
strategy. 24
B.

Trial Context

Preemptive disclosure of negative information has also been
tested several times in the trial context. In virtually all the studies,
preemptive disclosure of negative information was judged to be
strategically advantageous.247 Again, these studies offer valuable
information to the advocate regarding the strategic decision of
whether to disclose negative information. However, a close look at
the studies cautions against generalizing too broadly from them.
In one study, subjects heard two videotaped opening statements
of a mock civil trial involving an automobile accident.248 This study
purported to compare sponsorship theory with inoculation.249 In the
hypothetical case, a young man is driving "home from a party when
his vehicle overturns and he is killed."250 His family sues the
automaker, contending that the car had a propensity to overturn. 251
The key negative fact at the center of the study was that the driver
had been drinking before the accident, a fact that hurt the plaintiffs
case. 252 Group A (the sponsorship group) heard a plaintiff statement
that did not mention anything about the driver's drinking and heard
a defense statement that made full use of the fact that the driver had
been drinking.253 Group B (the inoculation group) heard the same
defense statement, but prior to that heard a plaintiff statement that
directly addressed and refuted the negative information.254 In it, the
plaintiffs attorney warned the jurors that the defense would argue
that the plaintiffs drinking caused the accident, but noted that

246. Stratman, supra note 2, at 46-49.
247. See, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 44, at 608; Douglas S. Rice & Ellen L.
Leggett, Empirical Study Results Contradict Sponsorship Theory, INSIDE LITIGATION,
Aug. 1993, at 22.
248. Rice & Leggett, supra note 247, at 21.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 20.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 21.
254. Id. at 21.

20081

PLAYING WITH FIRE

plaintiff was not known as a drinker and that plaintiffs blood alcohol
level was not above the legal limit.255
The inoculation group, who heard plaintiffs preemptive rebuttal
of the negative fact, was more likely than the sponsorship group to
discount the defense's arguments about the driver's drinking.256 The
inoculation group also had a more positive impression than the
sponsorship group of the plaintiffs attorney, who they "viewed as
more honest, organized, persuasive, poised and effective."257
Interestingly, the inoculation group also had a more negative
impression of the defense attorney, rating him "as less honest,
organized, clear, persuasive and effective, and as more nervous."258
When interviewed, the jurors in the sponsorship group said that it
would have made a difference to them had the plaintiffs attorney
confronted her client's drinking.259
In a similar but more in-depth study, participants were exposed
to an entire trial from beginning to end.260 The trial involved an
assault and battery, and the key piece of negative information was
that the defendant had prior convictions for the same crime.261 The
researchers referred to the negative information as "thunder" if the
negative information was volunteered and the researchers called it
"stolen thunder" in cases where the opposing side raised the
information.262 In Group One's trial, there was no mention of the
prior convictions ("no thunder").263 Group Two heard the identical
trial, except that at the end of the defendant's testimony the
prosecutor elicited the negative information ("thunder").264 Group
Three heard the same trial as Group Two, except that the defense
attorney elicited the negative information and refuted it as irrelevant
to the issue of guilt ("stolen thunder").265 Perhaps more importantly,
in Group Three the judge's instructions to the jury reiterated the
irrelevance of the prior convictions to the issue of guilt.266
The "thunder" group was more likely to believe in the
defendant's guilt than both the "no thunder" or the "stolen thunder"

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
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Id.
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groups. 267 But the "stolen thunder" group was more likely to believe
in guilt than the "no thunder" group. 268 The data certainly suggest
that "stealing thunder" is a risky strategy and that "no thunder" is in
many respects the preferred outcome. Therefore, the decision to
preemptively raise negative information should depend on whether
the information is likely to come out. 269 Similarly, the "no thunder"
group rated the defendant's credibility more highly than those in the
"thunder" group, but the "stolen thunder" group was only marginally
more impressed with the defendant's credibility than the "thunder"
group.270 That the boost to credibility by "stealing thunder" is only
marginal suggests that this strategy should be employed cautiously
and with a full realization of the downsides.271
While these studies offer some interesting information about
refutation, it is problematic to draw conclusions from them regarding
the effectiveness of preemptive disclosure as compared with post-hoc
refutation. These studies test preemptive disclosure against a
situation where the attorney who has been confronted with negative
information does not effectively argue against it at any time.272 What
these studies compare is a lawyer who preemptively discloses
negative information with a lawyer who makes no response when an
opponent uses negative information.273 Thus, all the studies really
demonstrate is that preemptive disclosure is better than being
attacked and offering no rebuttal,274 which is not the most relevant
question. Few lawyers would let an attack go wholly unanswered.
The question is whether to preempt the attack or wait for it and
argue against it after it is made.
Moreover, in the assault and battery study, the judge's
instructions to the jury reinforce the rebuttal made by the advocate
who is "stealing thunder."275 This casts doubt on whether the
strength of the response is due to the attorney's behavior or the
judge's instructions. The strength of the "stolen thunder" response
must be discounted because of the substantial boost given to the
"stolen thunder" strategy by the judge's instructions to the jury.

267. Id. at 601-02.
268. Id. at 601.
269. See id. at 602-03.
270. Id. at 602.
271. See id.
272. See Robert H. oonoff & Paul L. Colby, Responding to a May 2000 Legal
Article: The Flawed Empirical Testing of Sponsorship Strategy, 63 TEx. B.J. 754, 755
(2000).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Williams et al., supra note 48, at 601.
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In one study, however, preemptive refutation was tested against
post-hoc refutation in the context of a civil trial.276 In that study, the
case involved a shipyard worker who was exposed to asbestos and
died of lung cancer. 277 The negative information was that the
plaintiffs expert, who relied on medical records to testify that the
asbestos caused the plaintiffs cancer, had testified in a prior trial
"that using medical records to determine causation was not
scientifically valid."278
In the "no thunder" group, the jury heard only about the expert's
credentials.279 In the "thunder" group, the defense brought up the
negative information, but the expert refuted the information by
saying that, "as an expert.. . he could testify for both sides of such a
controversial issue."280 In the "stolen thunder" group, the expert
himself brought up the prior trial, and stated, as he did in the
"thunder" trial, that as an expert he could testify for both sides.281
In this study, both the "stolen thunder" and "no thunder" groups
were more likely to return a verdict for the plaintiff than the
"thunder" group, with a fairly significant difference between the
"stolen thunder" and "thunder" groups. 282 However, even with the
"thunder" version, forty-three percent of the jurors found for plaintiff,
as compared with sixty-five percent of the "stolen thunder" jurors
and fifty-eight percent of the "no thunder" jurors.283 Moreover, the
difference between "thunder" and "no thunder" was not significant,
which might suggest that the raising of the negative information by
the defense did not have a substantial impact on the verdict.284
Moreover, "thunder" (or lack thereof) did not make any significant
difference to the juror's assessment of whether asbestos caused the
plaintiffs cancer. 285 In terms of witness credibility, the "no thunder"
and "stolen thunder" groups did not differ significantly on credibility
ratings, and both groups rated the expert's credibility higher than
the "thunder" group.286

276. Id. at 604.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. This is a fairly unpersuasive refutation, one that most competent litigators
probably would avoid. Nevertheless, the same refutation was used in both the
"thunder" and "no thunder" scenarios, so it is difficult to argue that the weakness of
the refutation had an impact on the results.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 605.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 606.
286. Id.
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C. Why Does "StealingThunder" Work?
Although the success of the "stealing thunder" strategy can be
attributed in part to the inoculation effect and to credibility boosts,
researchers have looked beyond these reasons to determine why
"stealing thunder" works so consistently. Researchers have noted
that mock (and real) jurors are not necessarily always sympathetic to
the message being attacked, and therefore are not necessarily highly
motivated to counter-argue in response to an attack-two conditions
that are present in the strongest inoculation studies (on cultural
truisms).287 The absence of these conditions led researchers to believe
that inoculation and credibility are not the whole story in the legal
realm, and led them to speculate that an additional psychological
phenomenon might be at work.
One explanation that researchers offer is "framing," a concept
that is familiar to most legal advocates.288 The theory is that because
"stealing thunder" permits the advocate to "frame" the negative
information in the best possible light, jurors mentally process and
accept the more positive spin before they are exposed to the attack.289
Although framing is widely accepted in law as necessary to
neutralize negative information, one study found that the success of
"stealing thunder" did not depend on it.290
In that study, jurors read the fairly complex trial transcript of a
car accident case in which a head-on collision killed the driver of one
vehicle, although the other driver escaped with only minor
injuries.291 The driver who survived was then charged with vehicular
homicide.292 The prosecution argued that the defendant veered into
the other lane and was speeding.293 The defendant's theory of the
case was that the victim died because it took too long for emergency
personnel to arrive and transport the victim to the hospital.294 The
key piece of negative information was that the defendant had been
drinking at a party prior to the accident.295
In the "no thunder" version, jurors heard nothing about
defendant's drinking except that the blood alcohol test on defendant

287. Lara Dolnik et al., Stealing Thunder as a Courtroom Tactic Revisited: Processes
and Boundaries,27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 267-68 (2003).
288. Id. at 269.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 274.
291. Id. at 271.
292. Id. It should be noted that the researchers in this study are Australian, so the
laws and procedures used are those of Australia. Id. at 267.
293. Id. at 271.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 272.
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was inconclusive because the machinery had broken.296 In the
"thunder" version, the prosecution elicited from the defendant on
cross-examination that he had been drinking.297 In the "stolen
thunder framing" version, the defendant admits on direct
examination that he had been drinking, but testifies that he believed
himself able to drive.29s In the "stolen thunder-no framing" version,
the defendant simply admits to drinking, but offers no explanation.299
The results on framing are a bit surprising. As expected, the
"thunder" version resulted in the highest ratings of the defendant's
guilt and the "no thunder" version the lowest ratings of guilt.300 But,
although the "stolen thunder framing" version led to fewer findings of
guilt than the "thunder" version, that difference was not statistically
significant.301 The "stolen thunder-no framing" version, however, did
lead to significantly fewer guilty findings than the "thunder" version,
and also led to fewer guilty findings than the "stolen thunder
framing" version.302 However, only the "stolen thunder framing"
version improved the defendant's credibility.303
Researchers conclude from this that framing is not essential for
the "stealing thunder" effect.304 This is somewhat analogous to the
conclusion that inoculation can work without a script for refutationit can work with threat alone. However, it seems to contradict the
many studies outside the legal context that find nonrefutational twosided messages to be unpersuasive.305 Nevertheless, the study
authors qualified the results of their research and stopped short of
concluding that framing is not important. The authors of the study
acknowledged that the framing technique employed in the study was
not particularly effective, and that the defendant's personal belief
about his ability to drive after drinking might have been viewed by
jurors as self-serving and less than credible.306 As a result, they
concluded that a more effective framing of the negative information
might have led to different results.307 The study also led researchers

296. Id. at 271-72.
297. Id. at 272.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 273.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 274.
305. Because in the "stolen thunder-no framing" scenario, the defendant admitted
drinking (negative fact) but offered no explanation (no refutation), that scenario is
analogous to a two-sided nonrefutational message. See supraPart III.A.
306. Dolnik et al., supra note 287, at 275.
307. Id.
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to conclude that the success of "stealing thunder" was not necessarily
a result of credibility enhancement because of the differences in the
effects of framing on credibility and guilt findings.308
Having learned that the "stealing thunder" effect was not solely
a function of credibility, researchers sought to find what might cause
the success of this litigation strategy by testing two other hypotheses:
the "change of meaning" hypothesis and the "old news is no news"
hypothesis.309
The "change of meaning" hypothesis suggests that preemptively
disclosing negative information actually motivated message
recipients to change the meaning of the information to be less
damaging to the side offering it.310 In other words, as suggested in
sponsorship theory, jurors expect lawyers to offer information that is
positive for their side, and so jurors experience some "dissonance"
when lawyers offer negative information.311 However, contrary to
sponsorship theory-which posits that this dissonance leads jurors to
inflate the relevance of negative information-social scientists
theorize that jurors will resolve the dissonance by reinterpreting the
information to be more positive to the side that is offering it.312
The "old news is no news" hypothesis posits that if negative
information is preemptively disclosed, then its later use by opposing
counsel is perceived by the jury as "old news" and therefore will carry
less weight.313 This is the concept for which "stealing thunder" is the
core metaphor: once the jury has heard the "thunder," hearing it
again will have less impact.
To study this, researchers replicated the scenario in which the
head-on collision of a car accident killed one driver.314 The conditions
included the three basic conditions of "thunder," "no thunder," "stolen
thunder-no framing," plus two additional conditions.315 These
conditions were identical to the "stolen thunder-no framing," except
that the prosecution's response was altered.316 In "stolen thunder-no
repeat," the defendant admits to drinking, offers no explanation, and
the prosecution does not make any use of the evidence.317 In the
"stolen thunder-tactic revealed" version, the defendant offers the
same information, but the prosecution accuses the defendant on
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 269.
See id.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id.
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cross-examination of trying to manipulate the jury by being the first
to divulge damaging information.31s These two conditions were
designed to test the "old news is no news" hypothesis and whether
there is an effective counter-attack to the "stealing thunder"
319
strategy.
In order to test the "change of meaning" hypothesis, researchers
recorded jurors' perceptions of the weight and seriousness of the
negative evidence.320 Jurors were asked to rate how strong the
negative evidence was and how damaging they felt it was to the
defendant's case. 321 To assess the change of meaning hypothesis, only
the "stolen thunder-no framing," "thunder," and "no thunder"
scenarios were compared.322
The results demonstrated that the "old news" hypothesis did not
account for the "stealing thunder" effect.323 There was no significant
difference in guilty findings for the scenarios in which the
prosecution repeats the information after defendant preemptively
revealed it and where the prosecution does not repeat it.324 In other
words, the "stolen thunder-no framing" results were not significantly
different from the "stolen thunder-no repeat" results. Both effectively
reduced the percentage of guilty findings.325 The results also showed
that revealing the strategy of "stealing thunder-tactic revealed" to
jurors was an effective way to combat the strategy.326 The "stealing
thunder-tactic revealed" results were not significantly different from
the "thunder" results.327
The results showed support for the "change of meaning"
hypothesis as a reason for the success of "stealing thunder."32s Jurors
hearing the "stolen thunder" scenario were more likely to consider
negative evidence to be weaker and less damaging than those
hearing the "thunder" scenario.329 Researchers tested this across a
wide variety of scenarios, including evidence of the defendant's
drinking, forensic evidence that the defendant had veered across the

318. Id.
319. Id. at 276.
320. Id. at 277.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 279.
323. Id. at 283.
324. Id. at 279.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at at 279, 283 (noting that "warning the jurors that they had been
manipulated by a tactic motivated participants to correct for the effects of stealing
thunder").
328. Id. at 283.
329. Id.
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road, and evidence that the defendant was speeding.3ao However, the
researchers warned that the study did not show when the jurors'
perceptions changed-before the verdict or after the verdict-to
justify it.331
These studies offer legal advocates additional information to
enhance their understanding of the nonlegal science. Consistent with
the inoculation research, which demonstrated that the counterargument script was not essential, the legal studies show that
framing is not essential to the "stealing thunder" effect. Moreover,
"stealing thunder" works not only by boosting credibility, but also by
leading jurors to change the meaning and weight of the evidence.
Finally, the "stealing thunder" effect can be lessened or neutralized
by exposing the tactic.332
In addition to attempting to pinpoint the reasons for the
"stealing thunder" effect, researchers have also sought to discover the
optimal conditions for "stealing thunder." The research shows that
"stealing thunder" was most effective under conditions where the
jury was less likely to think and process the trial information deeply
and carefully-what researchers call conditions of low elaboration.333
In one experiment, mock jurors listened to a criminal trial in which
the "thunder" consisted of evidence of the defendant's prior record.334
The conditions under which the mock jurors heard the trial were
manipulated so that some jurors heard the evidence under conditions
shown to lead to low elaboration, and others heard the evidence
under conditions conducive to high elaboration.335 For example, the
low elaboration group heard a recording "that was lower volume,
faster paced, and contained more complex" language.336 They were
also given a "distracting" task to do while listening to the trialresearchers told them to record their impression of the audio quality
of the recording in addition to listening to the evidence.337 The low
elaboration group participants were also told that they were merely
330. Id. at 277. Researchers tested different negative information variables, not just
the defendant's possible drunkenness.
331. Id. at 284.
332. Id. at 286.
333. The study used the elaboration likelihood model, which posits that there are
two routes to decision making: a central route that is characterized by active attention
to and scrutiny of the issues and merits and a peripheral route that is characterized by
quicker, more superficial judgments. Mark V. A. Howard et al., How Processing
Resources Shape the Influence of Stealing Thunder on Mock-Juror Verdicts, 13
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 60, 61-62 (2006); see also Stanchi, supra note 194, at 43541 (discussing elaboration likelihood model in greater detail).
334. Howard et al., supra note 333, at 63.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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doing a pilot test to calibrate the materials and measures, whereas
the high elaboration group participants were told that they should
give their full attention to the merits of the case because their
answers were important to the researchers.338
The experiment demonstrated that "stealing thunder" worked to
reduce the number of guilty verdicts only under conditions of low
elaboration; for jurors who processed the information more carefully
and deeply, "stealing thunder" did not work as well in that it did not
lead to fewer guilty verdicts.339 This led researchers to conclude that
"stealing thunder" would be most effective when jurors are likely to
process with lower elaboration, such as when the evidence is
particularly complex or the issues challenging.340 At the same time,
"stealing thunder" will be less effective when message recipients are
likely to think carefully and thoughtfully about the merits.341
Researchers believe that these results are likely caused by either
overcorrection or reactance. 342 Overcorrection refers to the propensity
of people to correct for what they perceive as bias in their decision
making.43 Those who are thinking carefully about the evidence in a
case might perceive "stolen thunder" evidence as a potential red
herring that is distracting them from an accurate, merits-based
decision. As a result, they will correct for the bias they think is
caused by the red herring.344 Generally, when people try to correct for
perceived bias, they tend to overcorrect. 345 Reactance refers to the
response people have when they perceive that a message source is
trying to manipulate them.346 When people perceive that they are
being manipulated, they experience a threat to their decision-making
autonomy and often react with negative backlash against the
perceived manipulator.347 In the "stealing thunder" scenario, those
scrutinizing the evidence with care and thought might view "stealing
thunder" as a manipulative tactic and react by rejecting the
message. 348 Reactance also explains why revealing the tactic of
"stealing thunder" might neutralize the effect.349

338.
339.
likely
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id.
Id. at 64 tbl. 1. Indeed, those jurors in the high elaboration group were more
to find the defendant guilty when "thunder" was stolen.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This is sometimes called the "boomerang effect."
Id. (citing Dolnik et al., supra note 287).
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Overall, the studies of "thunder" in the legal context provide
another layer of knowledge for the legal practitioner looking for a
solution to the dilemma of what to do with negative information.
However, the number of studies and the limited focus of the studies
makes it difficult to draw from them a clear answer to this question.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA FOR PERSUASION IN

LAW
The big picture of the social science data suggests that, overall, it
is advantageous to preemptively disclose and refute adverse
information. However, there are a number of factors that qualify that
big picture.
A.

The GeneralRule: Be Open About Negative Information

The data demonstrate that two-sided refutational messages
consistently, and across a wide spectrum of variables, were more
effective, in that they resulted in more sustained attitude-change
that was less vulnerable to opposing arguments.350 This data is
especially relevant for opening statements and briefs by appellants or
movants because it demonstrates that the power of a message is
stronger if it confronts and refutes its weaknesses. The data on
inoculation support this by showing that, in particular, an
inoculation message can make the audience resistant to a broad
array of attacks on the message. It does not merely deflect the
particular attack anticipated and rebutted, but also provides some
protection against any number of novel, unanticipated attacks.
Finally, Professor Stratman's study351 and the "stealing thunder"
studies are also consistent in showing the advantages of volunteering
negative information.352
In terms of message style, the studies show a distinct advantage
for a message that directly and frankly deals with negative
information. Inoculation, for example, depends on the audience
perceiving a "threat" to the message, and a threat can only be
perceived if the message clearly announces the imminence of the
attack.353 Similarly, the trial studies suggest that it is the preemptive
disclosure of negative information that is critical to the "stealing
thunder" effect, not the "framing" of the information.

350. PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 178; Allen, supra note 77, at 396; O'KEEFE, supra
note 72, at 161; Szabo & Pfau, supranote 72, at 234; see also STIFF & MONGEAU, supra
note 71, at 142. Dr. O'Keefe concludes that "persuaders are well advised to employ
two-sided messages rather generally." O'KEEFE, supra note 72, at 162.
351. See Stratman, supra note 2.
352. See generally Howard et al., supra note 333.
353. STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 71, at 289; Pfau et al., supra note 146, at 39.
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This all suggests that the better approach in advocacy is one that
does not shy away from describing, with some depth, the negative
information and authority that it then refutes, which lends support
to the "scholarly" approach to brief-writing described by Professor
Stratman and the conventional trial wisdom on volunteering
weaknesses. The importance of threat also suggests that giving the
reader forewarning of an attack before the rebuttal, such as "Plaintiff
may argue that the Smith case controls" or 'You may hear that the
plaintiff had been drinking on the night of the accident," will
strengthen the inoculation response. Forewarning in this manner is
more common in trial strategy than in appellate brief strategy, where
advocates are concerned about giving voice to the other side's
arguments. 35 4 The need for forewarning is not explicitly tested in the
law experiments, but overall those experiments lend support for
open, frank confrontation.
The data not only counsel in favor of greater openness about
negative information, but also augment the conventional wisdom
about why volunteering negative information works. Inoculation, for
example, boosts credibility and gives the advocate the opportunity to
reframe
negative
information.355
Fact-finders
expect
that
knowledgeable experts will be aware of and address both sides of an
argument. This aspect of credibility-demonstrating honesty and
intelligence-has long been recognized by persuasive legal writers.356
However, volunteering weakness in a case does more than boost
credibility. It starts a mental and emotional process in the audience
that allows the audience to resist both similar and novel arguments
from the other side. Because inoculation works by stimulating the
message recipient to develop her own arguments against attacks on
the message, inoculating against negative information can
potentially help the advocate with arguments she has anticipated
and arguments that she has not.357 Inoculation also can stop the
audience from engaging in a counter-argument process that can be a
common backlash to an unduly positive one-sided argument. 358 While
this aspect of the inoculation effect has not been tested in the legal
arena, the strength of the nonlegal studies highlights a relevant area
for future research.
Moreover, not only does volunteering negative information
provide a shield against attacks, it also causes the audience to alter

354. See, e.g., BEAZLEY, supra note 32, at 79 ("You need not highlight your
opponent's arguments" by reiterating them.).
355. STIFF & MORGEAU, supra note 72, at 290-92.
356. SMITH, supra note 31, at 101-02.
357. See supra notes 132.37 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part III.B.
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its interpretation of the negative evidence to be less damaging.
Message recipients do not expect advocates to offer unfavorable
information, so when advocates do offer it the message recipients
resolve their confusion by making the evidence more favorable.359
Sponsorship theory is partly right when it notes that jurors do not
expect advocates to offer negative information.360 But the science
demonstrates that jurors do not hold the offer of negative information
against advocates as supposed by sponsorship theory, but rather
reinterpret it in the advocate's favor.361
Thus, the science shows that a direct and frank treatment of
negative information can have benefits beyond what even its
proponents in law would argue and that it is particularly important
in law, where the audience is trained to be skeptical and engage in
the counter-argument process. While we might associate skepticism
more with judges than with jurors, it is certainly arguable that jurors,
have become more skeptical of attorneys as the cultural perception of
attorneys as "hired guns" has become more prevalent.62 Indeed, even
sponsorship theory depends on the belief of its authors that jurors
view trial attorneys with great skepticism, even to the extent of
discounting any positive information the attorney offers in support of
his client's position.363 In contrast to sponsorship theory, however,
the science demonstrates that volunteering weakness is the more
effective way to deal with that skepticism.
In terms of structure, the data also confirm the conventional
wisdom on how to insert negative information once the decision has
been made to disclose it. Weaving negative information into the
positive message is the most effective organization. This lends
considerable support to the technique of burying negative
information within positive information, or juxtaposing negative
information with positive to neutralize it.364 There is some support
for leading with positive and following with negative information,
but, not surprisingly, no support for leading with negative and
following with positive.365
In sum, volunteering unfavorable information can work as a
sword (to boost credibility, to transform from negative to positive)
359. See id.
360. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 4, § 2.02(1).
361. See supra Part III.B.
362. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 4, § 2.02(1).
363. See id. § 2.02(2)(b).
364. BEAZLEY, supra note 32, at 186 (deemphasize contrary authority by placing it
in the middle of a point-heading section); id. at 148-49 (juxtapose bad fact with good
one to neutralize it); MAUET, supra note 37, at 114 (bury bad fact in middle of direct
examination and make it part of the story).
365. See supra note 364.
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and a shield (to resist attack). A powerful tool, indeed. Beyond the
big picture, however, are details that provide a deeper understanding
of negative information and its effect on the audience. There are a
number of caveats to the general rule of volunteering weakness, and
the advocate should be aware of these so that she can make informed
and nuanced decisions about when the general rule may not be the
most effective course of action.
B.

Caveat One: Volunteer Weakness Only if Attack is Certain

Virtually all of the studies presume that the opposing argument
will be made by the opponent. The studies therefore tell us only that
volunteering negative information is better than a one-sided, wholly
positive message if an attack is made.366 Only one study in the legal
arena tested "stealing thunder" when no use was made by the
opponent of the negative information.367 While that study showed
that "stealing thunder" had a beneficial effect regardless of whether
an attack was made, further study is probably warranted before
generalizing from that experiment.368
Several other studies within the legal arena have shown the
opposite-that if the attack never comes, volunteering negative
information is actually harmful, even if it is directly rebutted. These
studies show that the strongest position for the side vulnerable to
negative information is not when that information is volunteered and
rebutted ("stolen thunder"), but when there is no disclosure of the
negative information by either side ("no thunder").369
While it is likely rare that a legal opponent makes no attack, a
legal opponent might not, for many reasons, disclose a truly
damaging piece of negative information. Often, even with the liberal
discovery rules, opponents may not absorb the information or realize
its damaging nature. So, even taking into account the "blanket" effect
of inoculation, advocates are well advised to be wary about disclosing
damaging information unless they are certain an opponent will raise
it. After all, the inoculation studies show only that the rebuttal of
any relevant negative information provides resistance to a variety of
novel attacks; the studies do not suggest that the rebuttal must be of
the worst information.370 If disclosure of very damaging information
does come, the advocate can always refute it at that time. Because
the findings on the efficacy of preemptive versus post-hoc refutation
are unclear, the decision to rebut damaging information when the

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
Howard et al., supra note 333.
See id.
Williams et al., supra note 48, at 601, 604.
See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

other side discloses it-as sponsorship theory would advocate-is a
supportable and legitimate strategic choice in many instances.
C. Caveat Two: Sometimes Post-Hoc Refutation May Be Better
than Preemptive Refutation
Unfortunately, most of the studies in the trial context tell us
only the unsurprising fact that when a particular attack is certain, it
is better to refute it preemptively than to ignore it.371 This is not the
most relevant information for the legal advocate. Only in the direst
circumstances will legal advocates let an attack pass with no
response. The key question is whether to raise the negative
information preemptively, before your opponent, or make a post-hoc
refutation after the attack comes.
However, there is limited research comparing the effectiveness of
preemptive refutation with post hoc refutation. The only trial study
to do so demonstrated that preemptive refutation ("stealing
thunder") was more effective.372 Here again, however, preemptive
refutation was less effective than the "no thunder" position-where
the negative information was never raised-which reaffirms that
advocates should be quite certain the attack is coming before
volunteering the information. Moreover, the certitude of this one
study in the trial arena is undermined somewhat by inoculation
studies conducted outside the legal context. These studies suggest a
more complicated picture of preemptive and post-hoc refutation and
indicate a need for more testing in the legal arena.
The studies outside the legal realm find that preemptive and
post-hoc refutation work with differing degrees of effectiveness for
character and issue attacks. In studies where character was the
subject of the attack message, preemptive inoculation was more
effective than post-hoc refutation regardless of audience belief. This
is consistent with the trial study in which preemptive disclosure
helped the expert whose credibility was attacked by his prior
inconsistent testimony.373 However, in studies where the issues or
merits of the message were the subject of the attack, inoculation was
more effective than post-hoc refutation only with people who already
had a strong position, but was actually less effective than post-hoc
refutation with people who had weaker beliefs.374
The data suggest that a lawyer's feel for the position of the
audience is an important variable when deciding whether to depart
from the general advice of volunteering negative information. If the
371.
372.
373.
374.

See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
Williams et al., supra note 48, at 603-07.
See id.
See id. at 605-06.

2008]

PLAYING WITH FIRE

audience seems strongly favorable or hostile, inoculation is the best
strategy.37 5 On the other hand, if the audience seems neutral or more
weakly affiliated, post-hoc refutation may be better if the anticipated
attack is on the merits, but inoculation is better if the anticipated
attack is on character.376
The varying power of inoculation depending on the beliefs of the
audience, as well as inoculation's roots in cultural truisms, suggests
that, if possible, lawyers arguing before judges should carefully
research the judges for clues about the attitudes of the judges on the
issues raised by the case. This can include examination of the judge's
prior opinions or scholarship, any public statements on a particular
issue, or the judge's employment prior to his elevation to the bench.
If discernable, the leanings of the bench on a particular issue can
make a difference in the decision to inoculate or not.
In the jury trial context, identifying the attitudes of the jury is a
bit trickier. The attorney can rely on her recollections from voir dire
if she wishes to inoculate in her opening statement, or on her instinct
about the way the case is proceeding if inoculation will occur during
examination of a witness. Again, inoculation is more effective in most
situations, so if the advocate is unsure, inoculation should be the
default. But if the advocate has a sense of the audience and is divided
about the advisability of disclosure, the data suggest that there are
times to deviate from the default response.
D. Caveat Three: Volunteer Weakness Only If You Can Directly
Rebut It
Moreover, the message sidedness studies suggest that, overall,
adverse information should only be addressed if a refutation of the
adverse information is possible.377 These studies are complicated by
some confusion over the concept of refutation. When the science
refers to refutation, it usually means a very direct negation of the
adverse point, such as a direct attack on the merits or on
relevance.378 This would be the equivalent of arguing that a negative
fact is simply not true or is not relevant to the issue, or arguing that
an adverse authority is inapplicable or not actually adverse. For
instance, "You may hear that the plaintiff was drinking, but his
drinking is irrelevant to this dispute," or "While the Jones case has
some facts in common with the current case, it is distinguishable on
the key relevant facts." It is with these types of negation that the
persuasive advantages of two-sided messages are clearest.

375.
376.
377.
378.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
supra Part III.A.
id.
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In fact, the research clearly prescribes a strategy of preemptive
refutation only if the unfavorable information can be directly
negated. The research shows that two-sided refutational messages
are superior in terms of persuasive effect to one-sided, but that onesided are superior to two-sided nonrefutational messages. 379 This is
consistent with the inoculation studies as well.380 (Again, not entirely
surprising-if the information cannot be directly refuted, it is best
not to volunteer it.) The social science is borne out by the trial
studies, which tend to find that the "no thunder" (weakness is never
raised by either party) scenarios had better outcomes than the
"stolen thunder" (volunteering weakness) scenarios.381 So, if the
advocate either has no good answer to the negative information or
has reason to believe that opposing counsel may not raise the
information, then the best strategy may be to withhold the
information and risk having to make a post-hoc refutation. This
aspect of the message sidedness research, particularly combined with
the inoculation studies on post-hoc refutation, gives a small boost to
the advocates who counsel against volunteering information, such as
the proponents of sponsorship theory.
But, the research is less clear about the effectiveness of the kind
of less direct refutations that are the "meat and potatoes" of most
legal advocates. While it certainly happens, lawyers cannot count on
always being able to directly negate a bad fact or directly refute an
adverse authority. Much of the lawyer's arsenal for dealing with bad
facts and law involves subtler methods. For example, lawyers who
cannot directly negate a bad authority may reframe the question to
render the authority less relevant3s2 or may read the authority
broadly or narrowly to support their view.383 Lawyers seeking to deal
with bad relevant facts may juxtapose them to more positive facts in
order to blunt their force.384

379. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
380. The one study in the legal context that found framing to be unnecessary to the
"stolen thunder" effect conflicts with this, but the authors of that study acknowledged
that their "framing" strategy might have been ineffective. Dolnik et al., supra note
287, at 275.
381. See supra notes 248-71 and accompanying text.
382. For excellent examples of some of these techniques of argumentation, see
generally Laura E. Little, Characterizationand Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
372, 376 (1996) (suggesting that where facts are not helpful, advocates should change
"the characterization" of the argument).
383. See, e.g., id. at 383-85 (describing the expanding or contracting universe);
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 35, at 226-27.
384. As an example, in a breach of contract case involving a former employee's
violation of a noncompete clause, the former employee might note, "Although Acme
competes directly with Carrolton in the three prohibited counties, the competition
extends only to three product lines." See EDWARDS, supra note 54, at 194; see also
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The research on subtler methods of refutation is both
contradictory and limited. Sometimes, messages like "Crick Beer, the
price is premium but the net result remains superior drinking
pleasure" are better than purely positive messages-and sometimes
they are not. 38 5 This finding suggests that less direct refutational
strategies, particularly those that seek to "overwhelm" negative
information with positive, are riskier than direct refutation, but can
sometimes work. This leaves the advocate with a difficult choice
when, for example, the advocate cannot directly refute a negative
fact, but can argue that the negative fact is outweighed by positive
facts. Thus, a strategy along the lines of "It may be true that my
client was drinking, but he was not driving recklessly and did not
violate any traffic laws" is left uncertain by the science. Moreover,
there is a substantial gap in the science regarding the subtler
techniques of refutation and refraining that are frequently employed
by lawyers.386
When the available refutation is indirect, it may be better to
simply argue the good facts and take the chance that the negative
fact might not be raised (and even if it is, post-hoc refutation is still
available). Similarly, in a brief, attempting to outweigh a negative
authority with other positive authority may or may not be a winning
strategy when compared with simply pushing a positive version of
the case. It is interesting to note that the indirect refutational
strategies worked in written persuasive messages but not in the
televised advertisements. This might suggest that subtler refutation
will work in a written brief, but perhaps not in a trial where, as on
television, the message is conveyed verbally.
E.

Caveat Four: The CredibilityAdvantage May Depend on a
Variety of Factors

Although not the only reason, credibility of the message source is
certainly an important factor in deciding whether to volunteer
weakness. Interestingly, however, the credibility boost associated
with two-sided refutational messages is limited to messages about
social or political issues. In the advertising context, the credibility
advantage was greater with two-sided nonrefutational messages. In
the advertising context, therefore, it seems that there are times when
the message source may enjoy a credibility boost from being less
aggressively refutational.
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 35, at 378 ("Although Paley's memory is poor, he is an
excellent lawyer.").
385. Etgar & Goodwin, supranote 67, at 462 (emphasis added).
386. See Little, supra note 383, at 373; see also J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical And
Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: Confronting Adverse Authority, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV.
341 (2005).
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How this translates to the legal realm depends on the perception
of lawyers. Are we more like commercial advertisers, trying to sell
our client's position like an advertiser sells a product?387 Or are we
more like social or political commentators who have strong opinions,
but are not materially invested in changing audience position? If the
proponents of sponsorship theory are believed, most see lawyers as
"hired guns" who, like advertisers, have a strong bias that counsels
viewing their statements with great skepticism.
However, if this aspect of sponsorship theory is accepted, the
science contradicts the main tenet of the theory that the default
position should be to withhold information. Rather, if lawyers are
"hired guns," then the research indicates that a more balanced,
scholarly approach that eschews strong refutation would raise
credibility more effectively. On the other hand, if lawyers are
perceived more as informed experts with strong opinions, direct and
aggressive refutation might be the strategy more likely to raise
credibility.
The data suggest a number of interesting points to the legal
advocate. Sometimes, an advocate's credibility will be enhanced if she
appears more balanced and less adversarial. If an advocate feels that
she has lost credibility with her audience, she might consider
changing course toward a less aggressively argumentative style,
whether in briefing or in trial.
F.

Caveat Five: Volunteering Weakness is Less Effective Where
There is a Time Lapse and Where High Elaborationis Likely

Finally, both the weakening of the inoculation effect over time
and the ineffectiveness of "stealing thunder" for high elaboration
audiences casts a layer of doubt over the efficacy of volunteering
negative information in many legal contexts, including persuasive
writing. The inoculation response's decay certainly suggests that
preemptive disclosure may be most effective for trials of relatively
short duration and that inoculation may not be particularly useful in
persuasive brief-writing. On the other hand, particularly in the trial
context, if the attack is likely to come on cross-examination, shortly
after the direct examination of the witness, the decay of inoculation
is less of a factor.

387. The analogy between lawyers and salespeople has been made in a number of
contexts. See, e.g., KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 4, § 2.02(2)(b) (using example of
vacuum cleaner sales to illustrate point about legal persuasion); NEUMANN, supra note
31, at 305 ("Persuading is selling, and judges have accurately been described as
'professional buyers of ideas."') (quoting Girvan Peck, Strategy of the Brief, 10 LITIG.
26, 27 (1984)).
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The ineffectiveness of "stealing thunder" for high elaboration
audiences adds another scenario in which advocates may not want to
preemptively disclose negative information.388 First, the failure of the
"stealing thunder" strategy in conditions of high elaboration casts
some doubt on its utility anytime the audience is a judge. Similarly,
in rather simple jury trials with easily processed evidence, "stealing
thunder" would not be a recommended strategy because elaboration
is likely to be high. Elaboration is also likely to be elevated in high
profile cases where jurors and judges are highly involved and
motivated. Again, these points lend some support to those who
counsel against a default position of volunteering negative
information. In most scenarios where judges are the audience for the
message and in simple trials where jurors will be less distracted and
more attentive, elaboration is likely to be high and "stealing thunder"
is less likely to work in the advocate's favor.
Finally, the trial studies also demonstrate that once people
become aware that they are being manipulated, they can have a
"backlash" response. Again, this casts some doubt on the
effectiveness of "stealing thunder" in situations where a judge, who is
likely an experienced and savvy advocate, is the message recipient.
Even in situations where the audience is less savvy, the effect of
"stealing thunder" can be neutralized by pointing out the tactic.389
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article argues that in confronting the vexing question of
whether and how to disclose unfavorable information, legal advocates
should pay closer attention to social science. While the overall picture
lends support to those advocates who counsel in favor of a full and
open disclosure of negative information, that picture is qualified
somewhat by a closer look at the results of the individual studies.
What those studies show is that the decision to volunteer negative
information depends on a complicated algorithm that measures the
likelihood that the negative information will be used by the
opponent, 390 the availability of a strong and direct refutation, the
audience for the message, the nature of the negative information
(character or issue), and the duration and complexity of the case.
This Article also highlights a significant gap in the social science
research, particularly in the emerging discipline studying legal
advocacy. There is a need for more studies that focus on preemptive

388. See supra notes 333-41 and accompanying text.
389. Dolnik et al., supra note 287, at 286.
390. This itself is dependant on other factors, including, among other things, the
relevance of the information, its emotional resonance, and its availability to the
opponent.
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and post-hoc refutation, preferably using refutations that conform
more closely to those commonly used in legal practice. Moreover,
none of the studies speak to the many subtler refutational arguments
that lawyers employ in addition to the tactics of direct negation,
arguing irrelevance, or arguing that positive information outweighs
the negative. What are missing are studies that combine the
expertise of lawyers and social scientists. Collaboration in this realm
would greatly enrich both disciplines and produce studies that would
be directly applicable to the legal context. It is my hope that this
Article will inspire scholars to begin on that path

